

TRUTHFULNESS

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1. Foreword

It would be customary to begin with a definition of the topic, but with truthfulness this would be begging the question somewhat. Truthfulness is, and has been throughout history, the concern of a vast array of disciplines, looked at from many perspectives and with many different aims.

The English term itself is polysemous or multiply ambiguous, its denotation or extension shifting between and even sometimes within authors and disciplines. It is best seen as part of a semantic field where the issues invoked by its various meanings, also indexed by other neighbouring terms and expressions, 'are all variously enmeshed. Sometimes it is used in the literature as if it were the hyperonym for the field, sometimes with one of the more restricted meanings. This overview will thus address both aspects by taking a wide view of the issues with 'truthfulness' as a cover term for the entire semantic field, while also pointing to specific terminological uses.

Truthfulness is also a 'loaded' question one which touches deep human concerns and ethical convictions; this, needless to say, tends to entangle the web further (see also Steiner 1976, and Williams 2002). We shall be taking an interdisciplinary look at the issues, as is consonant with the scope and philosophy of our pragmatic perspective (see Verschueren 1999a,b, and his introductory essay to this Handbook); to focus only on the more technical takes on truthfulness in pragmatics proper (i.e. in the narrower sense indicated by Wilson & Sperber 2006) would, indeed, be short-sighted and limiting.

A few orienteering aids are offered here to signpost the main issues, and pitfalls, and to put the various aspects addressed in the macro-field into some sort of perspective. The relatively uncultivated patches and those in need of further clarification where future research could be usefully undertaken should become obvious along the way.

2. Introduction to issues and engagements in the field

2.1 *A view of the macro-field*

The field could be signposted on different dimensions: disciplinary foci, individual scholars' contributions, issues or topics, technical terms, methodological program or agenda, research instruments used, etc. It is possible, however, to discern two macro-foci or pursuits in the field which are transversal with respect to these dimensions.

The first main area can be described as methodological or theoretical and is typically found within philosophical and theoretical pragmatics speculations on understanding how understanding works, i.e. the *underlying principles*, the mutual presumptions or expectations, the comprehension heuristics (as termed in Wilson & Sperber 2006), which permit the understanding of meaning to be reached (from linguistic to inferred speaker's meaning). Salient among these postulated principles is (though increasingly less so in recent pragmatics discussions; see 2.4 below) truthfulness, or, more generally, an Aristotelian/Kantian 'Quality' of contents category which includes 'truthfulness' and/or 'sincerity'.

The second, which occupies the vaster area in the macro-field, is mainly definable by its focus on truthfulness as '*truth-telling*', seen in opposition to 'falsehood', lying and deception, with its focus indeed usually on the latter. In this area we find both descriptive and ethical agendas, looking at *deceptive non-truthfulness*, the ways deception can be and is perpetrated, and the circumstances it occurs in, within and across different specific contexts and, less often, though increasingly, across cultures (see, e.g., in Vincent Marrelli 2004: 313-376).

The two areas merge naturally on various dimensions. Questions involving types of linguistic truthfulness/non-truthfulness and types of speaker truthfulness

or sincerity are involved in both. There is scope for the confusion of issues too, when those involving underlying principles purportedly governing understanding (of different types of meaning and of implicatures or inferred intentions and meanings), overlap with those considering which principles are, might, or should be, involved in the coordination of society (see also Williams 2002: 38). The moral issues are rarely far away from here, too, and usually just as inextricably (and confusingly) enmeshed.

2.2 *A view of the engagements with truthfulness in pragmatics*

Within our ‘pragmatic perspective’, with its various interconnected micro-, macro-, and meta- theoretical and societal, descriptive foci or enterprises and their ‘socially relevant’ or ‘emancipatory’ applications (see Mey 1993: 310, 1994, 1998: 735; Andersen et al. 1999: 867), we find scholars naturally addressing both general areas of concern in the field identified above. The principal seeds for both (and, indeed, for the development of linguistic pragmatics) were provided by the Oxford philosopher H.P. Grice’s set of insights (see also, e.g. Wilson & Sperber 2006 on his influence). In his well-known (though perhaps less well-understood) Cooperative Principle (CP), which he explicated in the four Aristotelian/Kantian Categories of *Quantity*, *Quality*, *Relation* and *Manner*, Grice (1989 [1967]) suggested under that of *Quality*, a super-maxim: “Try to make your contribution one that is true” and under it, two more specific maxims, the first of which is “Do not say what you believe to be false”, the second “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence” (see Grice 1989:26f).

Among the linguists (the pragmatics pioneers) who engage/d in the first (**methodological/theoretical**) enterprise inspired by Grice, we find Gordon & Lakoff (1971); R. Lakoff (1971, 1973, 1977); Cutler (1974); Weiser (1974); followed a little later by Leech (1981, 1983); and by Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995); Levinson (1983, 2000); Horn (1984, 1988, 1996, 2004); the participants in the 1990 Berkeley Linguistics Society parasession on ‘the legacy of Grice’ (Hall et al. 1990); Harris (1996); Wilson (1997); Wilson & Matsui (1998); and Wilson & Sperber (2002) (and see also Wilson & Sperber 2006 for a list of ‘neo-Griceans’)². Grice’s first *Quality* sub-maxim was dubbed the ‘truthfulness maxim’ by Wilson (1997) and Wilson & Sperber (2002), and they see it as concerning ‘literal’ truthfulness.

It is worth issuing a word of warning straightaway, however: the terminological ground is not firm here. In Wilson & Matsui (1998: 7) and in Wilson & Sperber (2006), 'truthfulness' is used to refer to Quality in general. And, it is the super-maxim, for some other writers (see e.g. linguists Akmajian et al. 2001: 371; philosopher, Habermas 1998), which would apparently be 'truthfulness' (understood as trying to make your contribution correspond to facts), while the first sub-maxim would involve a speaker's beliefs or 'sincerity'. Horn (2004: 7) simply speaks of Quality, when referring to Grice, while saying that it is "what Lewis (1969) calls his (convention of) truthfulness".

Grice himself did not use the term 'truthfulness' directly to label any of his maxims; 'exegesis' of his texts shows that he implied the first sub-maxim in his first lecture (1989: 32), the super-maxim in his retrospective epilogue (1989: 371). However, it also seems clear that for him the super-maxim was not meant as the first of three, but rather the super-ordinate term for the whole Quality 'bundle'; if this is true, then it/they concern intention to make 'genuine', 'non-spurious' contributions (1989: 27, 28), "truthful rather than mendacious" (1989: 371): truth-telling, sincerity, in other words, not simply strict literal truthfulness.

Because of this somewhat embarrassing and frustrating instability of our central term, even in technical usage in and around pragmatics, it is wiser to try to focus on the issues rather than on the terms themselves, while remaining alert to possible variations in the reference of the term in different writers/disciplines.

In the **descriptive** and **socially relevant** or **emancipatory** enterprises within pragmatics, the take on truthfulness, as in the wider field, is definitely on its truth-telling meaning, indeed, on the other side of the coin: the description of ways that the different types and levels of meaning and intentions, and maxims (not just the Quality set), can be manipulated/exploited for deceptive purposes.

Among the early contributors in the 'descriptive' enterprise, we must again mention Robin Lakoff (1972, 1973, 1981); Weiser (1974); and Fraser (1994). Here we can also place Castelfranchi & Vincent (1977/1997), Vincent & Castelfranchi (1981), Vincent (1994), and more recently Castelfranchi & Poggi (1998), who use goal-analytical instruments, where an interlocutor intent on deception mind-models his/her victim and works on presumptions concerning the cognitive context (interlocutors' perceived mutual knowledge, goals and needs, and presumptions of contextually relevant or needed knowledge); see also in Vincent Marrelli (2004: 221-288). In Vincent Marrelli (1997; 2004, e.g. 203-214, 218-220; 315-376) - where

the focus is on cultural dimensions of truthfulness, non-truthfulness and deception, and especially **attitudes** to and **expectations** of either – the presumed mutual knowledge and expectations would also include cultural context, and the implicits of communication values in different discourse worlds or cultural models of talk³.

Next, to mention the engagement with deception issues in another discipline which is part of the pragmatics perspective, conversational analytical (CA) instruments have also occasionally been used to illuminate lying and other types of deception. Sacks (1975/1961) is the prime example, where he showed that “everyone has to lie”, i.e. to avoid giving information another may not want, or to avoid obliging a non ‘proper conversational partner’ to enter into further inappropriate turns (e.g. when responding to the question “how are you?”). CA instruments are also explicitly used by Coulthard (1981) to analyze Iago’s ploys in *Othello*, and are also briefly implied by Fraser (1994) and, more explicitly deployed by McHoul (1994); Harris (1996), and by Bull (e.g. 1997, 1998 a, b, 1999, 2003) in the sphere of ‘equivocation theory’ (see also Bavelas et al. 1990). In Vincent Marrelli (2004: 218-219) it is also suggested that the twin notions of preference and dispreference (assumed to be reflexes of implicit expectations by participants) could be profitably more widely used in the analysis of deception (but see Van Dijk’s 2005b proviso on this since CA supposedly admits only observable explicit evidence). Vincent Marrelli (2004: 193-198) also suggests that the strategic choice of different deceptive strategies or means, as discussed by Castelfranchi & Poggi (1998: 164 ff.) would also hinge on their sequential positioning in an interaction, the previous and presumed expected moves (and the projected probability of a Hearer’s coming to have ‘true knowledge’). It is not being suggested here, either, that CA methods alone can cast full light on deception, but simply that it can bring, along with other methods, some valuable insights, and that it has not perhaps yet been fully exploited in this field.

Among the more explicitly **socially relevant** applications or engagements (not necessarily always neatly distinguishable from the descriptive enterprise, naturally) we find Bolinger (1973, 1980); Garfinkel (1977); R. Lakoff yet again (1981, 1990); Gumperz (1982a); Geis (1982); Hughes (1988); Cook (1992); Morley (1998); Janicki (1998); Wortham & Locker (1999); Van Dijk (2000, 2005 b); Hardin (2001); Bull (e.g. 1999, 2003), variously describing and unmasking sneaky, ‘equivocal’ or obfuscatory practices by mass communicators (‘propaganda’ and ‘persuasive discourse’ in domains such as the media, government and politicians, the military, bureaucracy, advertising, court tribunals, etc.) and thus, by extension,

engaged in emancipating the more trusting or naive sections of the public. With Van Dijk (1995, 1999, 2001, 2005 a, b); Mey (1994); Chilton (1998 a, b, c); the contributions in Blommaert & Bulcaen (1998); Blommaert et al. (2001); Blommaert & Verschueren (1998); Verschueren (ed.) (1999); Wodak & Meyer (2001), Wodak & Chilton (2005), the approach taken and developed merges with that of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and we thus see an even more explicit engagement in emancipatory theorizing and praxis, one intent on demystifying and raising awareness of ideological structuring perpetrated through discursive practices, and on unveiling how social reality, truth and meaning are constructed and controlled, and people manipulated through language. For overviews of issues, main scholars and works in CDA before and after the merger, the reader is referred to Birch (1998); Luke (1998); Fairclough (1998 a, b); Wodak & Meyer (2001), Wodak & Chilton (2005); to Abbinett (1998) and Barrett (1991) for some relevant philosophical discussions; and to the foundational authors Foucault (1971); Bourdieu (1991); Fowler et al. (1979); Hodge & Kress (1988); Fairclough (1989).

In Van Dijk's work especially, for example (see again 2005 a, b, and his references to his work since 1999); it also explicitly merges back into an agenda of theoretical and methodological model making of pragmatic understanding, and indeed with a generally 'hermeneutic' approach (see below), in that it pursues the understanding of understanding, by developing a pragmatic model of context, one explicitly including mutual knowledge.

Researchers engaged in ***cross-cultural investigations*** of discursive practices, which reveal, among other things, underlying folk theories of language and truth, and attitudes to truth-telling and deception, are also often consciously and actively 'engaged' in a social struggle: that *against* ethnocentricity, intercultural misunderstanding and pejorative stereotyping, which can generate hostility and racism, and *for* intercultural awareness raising and 'education'. Among the leading scholars in different fields who have set the example and provided the instruments for intercultural interaction and cross-cultural analyses, are Fishman (1982); Gumperz (1982, ed. 1982, 1988); Gumperz, Roberts & Jupp (1979); Hall (1959, 1966, 1976, 1983); Brown & Levinson (1978); Tannen (e.g. 1991); Wierzbicka (e.g. 1990); Gudykunst (e.g. 1998); Trompenaars & Kasper & Blum-Kulka (1993); Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper (1989); Hofstede (1994, 2001, 2002); McSweeney (2002a,b); Scollon & Scollon (1995); van Dijk (2001, 2003); Verschueren (1999c); Blommaert & Verschueren (1991, 1998); Verschueren et al. (2002); and see

also Vincent (-Marrelli) (1989, 1997, 2004) where specific attention is given to truthfulness issues. Until very recently in pragmatics the cross-cultural or intercultural perspective has been typically underplayed (or largely ignored) by theoretical pragmatics. The foundation in 2004 of the journal *Intercultural Pragmatics* (De Gruyter), where central figures of theoretical pragmatics are also contributing, does bear a promise, however, that the pursuit of universals will proceed now in a non-abstract way (or one based only on observations in/speculations on one currently dominant culture), as well as providing potentially useful insights on cultural differences for the social as well as theoretical agendas of pragmatics, garnered now through the use of instruments from pragmatics itself. The tide might thus be turning, thanks also, no doubt, to the increasingly international make-up of the community.

At any rate, we shall be considering throughout here (as in earlier work) how the cross-cultural perspective sheds light on some underlying assumptions and values held by speakers in different cultures, and thus helps to avoid ethnocentric or 'facile' generalizations on theoretical and moral issues concerning truthfulness.

2.3 *Precursors and neighbours on the issues*

The second of the two macro-foci identified in §2.1, and that on truth-telling and deception, has an ancient pedigree as one might expect. In the West, it begins traditionally with Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics IV*), followed by Augustine (*De mendacio, and Contra mendacium*) and Aquinas (*Summa Theologica II.II. quest.109-113*) and continues vigorously to this day (see Feehan 1998 for a wide-ranging and comprehensive bibliography, and §6 below for reference to specific important works on deception; see also the (fascinating) works by philosophers and historians on the history or 'genealogy' of truth (and related concepts), such as Trilling (1971); Foucault (1984), Detienne (1996), Fernandez-Armesto (1997), Williams (2002)⁴, and, e.g., by the journalist Campbell (2001).

Speculations on *underlying or shared tacit principles* allowing interlocutors to reach understanding (the first macro-focus mentioned in §2.1) also have a very respectable pedigree, nor are they by any means limited to Gricean pragmatics; they did not just spring out of the blue with Grice (as we might sometimes imagine from reading introductory textbooks on pragmatics). Brisard (2000), following

Grandy & Warner (1986) should be especially useful in putting Grice back, for the shorter-sighted pragmatics community, into his wider and deeper philosophical context, that concerned with the rational grounding⁵ of his philosophical (psychological, ethical and metaphysical) project (see also Parret 1997, and some discussion in Vincent Marrelli 2004:...). On precursors of Grice, and how inferences/implicatures (the not said) are generated from the said, Horn (see 1973, 1990, 2001: ch.1, and see 2004: 8-9) is also especially instructive and attentive to precursors. He traces “proto-conversational rules in the history of logic” (his 1973 sub-title) starting from Aristotle and his square of oppositions. The focus (in his 1973 and 1990 *excursi*) is on modal and quantificational relations and entailment scales, and the inferences/implicatures deriving from the use (in ordinary language in context as opposed to that in logic) of (logical, epistemic and deontic) modals (e.g. referring to possibility), quantifiers (saliently *some*), and scalar adjectives (e.g. warm, hot). The main focus is thus on what the Quantity category of maxims in Grice’s apparatus captures: how, e.g., possibility is infelicitously asserted when a stronger predicate (certainty) is *known to* hold for the argument in question, or when asserting that you ate ‘some’ of the cookies, when you actually ate ‘all of them’, or conceding that you smoked ‘a cigarette’ when you actually smoked ‘four or five’, or describing something as ‘warm’ when it is the case that it is really ‘hot’. It is also obvious, that Quality is somehow involved too (e.g. in the cookies and the number of cigarettes examples). Both Horn and Levinson (1983, 2000) (as we shall mention later) do accord Quality a privileged status, as a background given (see e.g. Horn 2004: 7). And this can be exploited deceptively. One can, indeed, equivocate deliberately between the semantic one-sided readings, lower-bounded by their literal meaning (‘at least some’, ‘at least one’) and the two-sided pragmatic understanding (‘some but not all’, ‘exactly one’, ‘not more than one’) derived by an upper-bounding scalar implicature (see Horn 1990: 454). In Horn (1990), he also traces earlier versions of the other maxims. However, “[i]t was Paul Grice who put it all together” and who formulated the general Cooperative Principle, of which he reminds us “the maxims must be seen merely as special instances” (Horn 1990: 463, referring also to Green 1990).

As for ‘truthfulness’ as a/the underlying presumption or expectation, seen as the Archimedean lever to anchor linguistic or referential meaning in the first instance, the issues (not unmixed with ethical, epistemological and social coordination questions) in the philosophical literature go back at least to Hume (1740/1972)

and to Reid (1764/1970) who speaks of “two principles which tally with each other. The first of these ... is a propensity to speak truth...another...is a disposition to confide in the veracity of others, and to believe what they tell us” (1971: 238-241) (see also Prijič-Samaržija 2003, on the differences between Hume and Reid and the underlying connected faces of coordination of ‘interpretive benevolence’ (trust) and ‘epistemic cooperation’ (truthfulness)). Lewis’s (1969/1983: 167) ‘convention of truthfulness and trust in L’ is an obvious echo of this tradition too. Hume also spoke of the “propensity of the mind to spread itself on external objects”; this ‘Humean Projection principle’ (developed by Grice 1991 - see pp. 88 ff., 121 ff. where he is outlining a ‘philosophical psychology’ (1989: 121), “a metaphysical construction routine” (1990:87) he had been contemplating in the early seventies, etc.), is connected to that of the love of ‘truth’ and to ‘benevolence’ by Parret (1997) and Longato (1999).

Kant (1797), calling more explicitly for a ‘rational hermeneutic’, as Steiner (1976: 414) puts it, had, as is well-known, truthfulness/truthtelling as a ‘categorical imperative’ (*CI*) (see *Groundwork*, and 1997: vii-xxxvi, Korsgaard’s introduction). This may seem at first sight to be only a (prescriptive) moral law, but it has a rational basis (and thus an underlying idea of shared assumptions: “rationality requires that we regard ourselves as governed by the moral law”, 1997: xxvii). The *CI* in general is a definition of what morality is, and one also based on a notion of reciprocity: “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (Kant: AK: 4.421- see *Groundwork* and vii-xxxvi, Korsgaard’s introduction, espec: x-xi). It has three different facets or formulae, that of Humanity, that of Autonomy or the Kingdom of Ends, and that of (wishing it rationally to be) a Universal Law. We can try to think through it, thus: insofar as it is something that we as autonomous rational human beings would will to be a universal law or maxim, and legislate it ourselves, it also moves us insofar as we are rational. What moves us to formulate a maxim or law is an end; ends which are important to us as human beings, such as knowing, understanding. These ends we share as human beings. It is also morally wrong to not respect the autonomy or freedom of the other, not to respect her ends (to treat her as a means to one’s own ends), so rationally and morally we must be truthful. Otherwise we would not only not be respecting the other’s autonomy⁶ or humanity, we would also undermine the possibility of reaching knowledge together (as Reid also saw), of trusting each other’s use of language.

Later we find principles postulated of ‘Charity’ by N. Wilson (1959) and Quine (1960), in his ‘radical translation’ program, and by Davidson (1984: 197) in his of ‘radical interpretation’; then ‘Humanity’, as Grandy (1973: 43) called that of ‘Charity’ (see e.g. discussion in Taylor 1998: 155-158, 178 n.13, 179 n.14). We also find the ‘convention’ of ‘truthfulness and trust in *L*’ formulated by Lewis mentioned above (see D. Lewis 1969, 1983; and discussions e.g. in Wilson & Sperber 2002: 2004: , Horn). These aforementioned twentieth century philosophers are perhaps more clearly engaged with the anchoring of semantic and referential meaning, than with that of pragmatic or conversational implicatures attempted by Grice with his CP. Interested readers are urged, with regard to all this section, to not take the present account on faith, but rather to follow it up from more authoritative sources, e.g. from Warmbrod (1991), Ramberg & Gjesdal (2005)⁷ and are, moreover, invited to see them as belonging to the general hermeneutic tradition to which we now briefly turn.

To continue indeed, with the task of indicating appeals (other than in core pragmatics proper) to assumptions of truthfulness as the lever to mutual understanding, we can also see that it is also found in some areas and concerns of the *hermeneutics* tradition in philosophy. This is not simply parallel or unlinked to the development of pragmatics, since it constitutes more than a mere back-drop to all theoretical pragmatic speculations on understanding, and thus also to Grice — who was a philosopher after all. For general discussions of hermeneutics see Longato (1999) (who focuses on truth and the charity principles in its history); see also Ormiston & Schrift (1990), and Ramberg & Gjesdal (2005)⁸

Most recently in this tradition we can see an appeal to truthfulness in what has been dubbed Universal Pragmatics by Habermas (1979) and in the sister programme of Transcendental Pragmatics associated with Apel, both scholars of the Frankfurt school. Habermas (1998) postulates an intuitive rule consciousness, of unavoidable presuppositions interactants have if communication is to be successful, with three ‘validity claims’ which speakers raise in and by their speech acts: to the truth/truthfulness of what is said or presupposed, to the truthfulness/sincerity of the speaker, and to the normative rightness, or ‘correctness’, of the speech act in the given context (alongside a claim to the understandability of the utterance). The three validity claims refer to different types of reality: the material world, the speaker’s belief world, and the interpersonal social world. Understanding is “intersubjective mutuality... shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one

another". His agenda is also ethical and political or social (see also in Powell & Moody 2003).

Gadamer (1989) speaks of coming to an understanding of what a person says as a "fusion of horizons" (1989: 374-375, 397) accomplished by "transposing [oneself] into the other", by "recognising the substantive rightness [or possible truth] of his opinion" (1989: 385, 394), as a mirroring or 'speculation' (p. 465-469). (see, e.g., Ramberg & Gjesdal for a necessarily more complex perspective on Gadamer, however).

Meier (1757) had spoken of *aequitas ermeneutica* (see Longato 1999: 31-73, also for *his* precursors).

Wittgenstein (1953: 241, 242), let us remember, said that "if language is to be a means of communication, there must be agreement not only in definitions but also [...] in judgements". And his even more famous sentence: "If lions could talk, we wouldn't be able to understand them".... We live in different life-worlds, or interpretive communities, or horizons, but there is enough commonality among humans to be able to enter another one (also contemplated in the Minimalist school in cognitive science (Chomsky, Hauser) where the emphasis is on universal modules of mind but which can also adapt and account for variability).

Mention must also be made, of course, in this overview of appeals to underlying principles or presumptions for understanding (among them truthfulness/sincerity), of that found in the other earlier, foundational program in pragmatics, that of Speech Act Theory. Allan (1998a: 298) makes the connection with the Gricean paradigm when he says that sincerity conditions have the same function as, or can be identified with, the 'cooperative maxim of quality' (although he does not specify which maxim); furthermore, among the preparatory conditions for assertives, we find something akin to the second sub-maxim: 'S has evidence for (reasons for believing etc.) the truth of *p*' (see Allan 1998b: 926, where he reports and compares Searle's and other scholars' formulations). The satisfaction of all preparatory conditions is 'presupposed' or 'prejected' [sic]. "They are special cases of the generally applicable cooperative conditions on utterances" (Allan 1998a: 297). Habermas, it must also be added/remembered, was also influenced by Speech Act Theory. All these 'programmes' can, thus, be seen as engaged in some sort of dialogue (or, rather, multi-party interaction) with each other. And it seems unlikely that Grice's (echoing) use of the Kantian categories of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner may not be a mere whim (see Morpugo-Tagliabue 1981) or describable as a 'nod'

to Kant (Horn 2004:...). He also echoes, for that matter, Kant's notion of 'supreme principle' (see Grice 1989, Vincent Marrelli 2004).

All these philosophical 'programmes', with due differences, also arguably have in common, the idea of 'empathy', of 'projecting over' the other, 'charitably', one's own 'humanity', an assumption of common rationality, and 'interest', and the assumption that truth, true information is a fundamental concern (Davidson 1997: 15), that it is 'valuable' (Parret 1997). One needs to "count [others] right in most matters", "to act as if the generally desired goal of others is the truth and its communication" (Davidson 1984: 197). Davidson is also to be numbered, indeed, as mentioned above, among the scholars in the wider hermeneutic paradigm.

The idea of projection into the mind of others, that is of intersubjectivity, is also akin, arguably, to what is referred to increasingly as 'mutual modelling' in, for example, that of goals in the AI cognitive agent modelling pursuit (see e.g. Conte, Castelfranchi, mentioned *ops. cit.*), and to 'mind-reading' and 'meta-representation' (see Sperber 2000), where no presumption of truthfulness or 'sharing' of goals is seen as needed (see also Green 1990: 416); even that of 'mutual knowledge' (see Smith 1982) and as in Van Dijk's recent appeal to develop 'cognitive context' for a pragmatic model of understanding (2005a,b, 2006) mentioned earlier, can thus be seen perhaps as involving not actual 'coming to an agreement' or sharing and adopting each other's goals or knowledge, but rather as the sort of presumed shared tacit knowledge from which one can assume and make calculated predictions of where the other 'is coming from' and 'what s/he's up to' because you can assume like-mindedness; the other is predictable, and understandable, because you assume s/he is like you/thinks like you, from the same sort of premises and background or 'common ground', not because you assume s/he is being cooperative or truthful). Intersubjectivity, and mutuality do not mean reciprocity.

The reasoning is also found in various authors who favour an evolutionist cognitive view of social behaviour, in game-theoretic terms, and do not necessarily assume reciprocity of beliefs, goals, as necessary for cooperation. Cooperation among humans may often be based on altruism (where ego has little or no immediate pay-off), but it may also be based on long-term calculation of selfish benefits or utility.

Perhaps even the categorical imperative of truthfulness could be rationalized a-morally this way- it is useful to everyone if people are normally orientated to telling the truth, and may thus even be 'wired' to do so by default?

Be that as it may, as we have seen, the methodological discourse on principles underlying/enabling understanding (of meaning, of intentions and inferences) has very significantly and often appealed to a presumption of truthfulness. It is thus, often, somewhat entwined with, or difficult to distinguish from, ethical concerns, in some of the discussions, as mentioned earlier. Grice took pains (1989: 368-9) to re-explain that his was not a moralizing or even descriptive program, as he has often been wrongly ‘accused’ of (see Thomas 1998: 173; Green 1990; Gu 1994; Horn 2004: 8; and see Horn 2004: 7 on how the “nature of the [Gricean paradigm] enterprise stubbornly continues to be misunderstood”). Interestingly, and importantly, Grice himself (in his less widely known 1983 Carus lectures and in other symposia – published posthumously in 1991 as *The conception of value* — where he was developing the idea of ‘Humean Projection’), did indeed argue for the methodological importance of taking ‘value judgments’ into account. They are objective, part of the world we live in, and constructed by us. Parret (1997) has further elaborated on this specifically for truth/fulness as a value (see also Williams 2002: 57 ff., on truthfulness as valued); getting to the truth is valuable, it allows us to plan and act more successfully, we thus value and desire others’ truthfulness (and tend to/wish to assume it). This programme (as does Davidson’s, for example), it is important to stress, has value judgments as part of the *data* in the methodological enterprise, and not as part of the *researcher’s* or scholar’s unwitting or hidden moral agenda.

2.4 *Some more recent developments in pragmatics*

Within pragmatics proper an assumption of truthfulness/sincerity is typically no longer postulated as being a sufficient (nor, indeed, always necessary) condition for speaker meaning or interaction coordination, i.e., the issue of truthfulness is not (explicitly) as saliently addressed as earlier. On the one hand, there is an attempt to incorporate explicitly social or non-formational aspects and functions of communication. On the other, there is a focus, as anticipated above with Horn and Levinson, on the other, rational heuristics based on assumptions regarding, variously, more the maxims of Quantity, Manner, and Relation (in different combinations).

With regards to the first: following hints from Grice (1989: 28) on the need for other maxims ‘(aesthetic, social, or moral)’, if one were to attempt to deal with other than talk-exchanges focusing on the exchange of information,

R. Lakoff (1971, 1973, 1977), Leech (1981, 1983), Brown & Levinson (1978) and Goody in her editorial introduction to their work, had already attempted, to various extents, to incorporate politeness principles into the picture. More recently, for example, Fraser (1990); Kasper (1990); Escandell-Vidal (1996); Terkourafi (2001); Brown & Levinson's introduction to their 1987 re-edition; Aston (1988); Harris (1996); and others in the Relevance theoretic paradigm, are reviving the programme somewhat.

More developed and salient in theoretical pragmatics at present perhaps is the second (more general rationalist) track, mentioned above, with its attempt to explore important insights coming from cognitive psychology and modelling, information-theory and game-theory insights on coordination (Sperber & Wilson (1985); Wilson & Sperber (2002; see also 2006; Ortiggi & Sperber (2000); Horn (2001); Levinson (2000)). As Wilson & Sperber say in their conclusions to their 2006 overview of pragmatics, and peroration of RT reasoning: owing to the maturation of the cognitive sciences, "priority in philosophy has shifted from philosophy of language to philosophy of mind. The development of pragmatics reflects this shift" (with consequent methodological implications on the reduced role of linguistic meaning in understanding). In their different ways, Levinson (2000: 7) specifically, they all contest the need to propose 'special, exotic, hermeneutic principles' to explain how interpretation (at least of Generalized Conversational Implicatures, GCIs) is constrained. Among these authors the focus is on 'heuristics' or underlying presumptions regulating the 'economy' of linguistic information (see also briefly and clearly in Horn 2004: 24-25). Levinson posits Q- ('Quantity'), I- (Informativeness) and M- (Manner) principles; Horn's principles are Q- (which collapses together Grice's Quantity 1, and Manner 1,2) and R- (which collapses together Grice's Relation, Quantity 2 and Manner 3,4); Sperber & Wilson (1985) and Wilson & Sperber (2002) postulate a single principle of Relevance to do all the 'bridgework', for Relevance Theory (RT), Relevance is the insubstantiation of the general rational principle (including that of economy of effort). For Horn (as he suggests in 2004: 25), it is "Quantity (in both its oppose (Q and R) sub-forms, [which] is a linguistic insubstantiation of these rationality-based constraints on the expenditure of effort". And furthermore, that "Of course, as Grice recognized, the *shared tacit awareness* of such principles to generate conversational implicatures is a central property of speaker meaning within the communicative enterprise" (emphasis added here to highlight again how the intersubjectivity,

like-mindedness, presumed mutual knowledge and modelling notion is essentially present in 'understanding' each other).

Yet, notwithstanding this more recent rational emphasis in pragmatics, assumptions of truthfulness/sincerity are arguably embedded in all these proposals (see also an explicit confirmation of this on Horn 2004: 7). Horn indeed sees Quality as "primary and essentially unreducible" (2001: 194). Levinson's program, while focusing only on GCIs, "one relatively small area of pragmatic inference" (2001: 22), for which Quality presumptions are not a necessary heuristic, nonetheless says they have "[only] a background role" in their generation (Levinson 2000: 74). Even Wilson & Sperber (2002) who take issue with what they call the 'truthfulness maxim' in particular, and on technical grounds, and explicitly contest it as well as Lewis's (1969, 1972/1986, 1983) Convention of Truthfulness (as Horn calls it in 2001: 194), are not denying a general preference for a speaker's sincerity (Wilson & Sperber 2002: 19), although they are denying it a heuristic role and priority; for them in RT, truthfulness is subsumed under Relevance (2002: 21-22), their sole 'supreme' (rational) principle, as said above, and as is well-known.

Trust (expecting truthfulness/ interpretive benevolence) can also be rationally motivated (see Kant after all). A hearer assumes that the speaker assumes that it is in the long run of mutual benefit if all speak truthfully. At any rate, cooperation does not necessarily need reciprocity but merely mutuality (Stevens & Hauser 2004). Assuming truthfulness, as Sperber (2002) also hints, is a calculated projection based on rational calculation that it is better for all, and pays off in the long run.

Levinson (2000), moreover, to move back now to the other mentioned focus, explicitly mentions the possibility, for the generation of Particularized Conversational Implicatures (PCIs) in other parts of the 'semiotic pie' (Levinson 2000: 14), of there being such things as specific assumptions of interactional politeness (see Levinson 2000: 423 n.96; Brown & Levinson 1987: 288-289). Horn (2001: 194) sees his two 'antinomic' or 'countervailing Zipfian forces' as capable of governing, among a wide range of phenomena, politeness strategies too.

The two new tracks in pragmatics may indeed be complementary, not antagonistic. When their scope eventually come into consensual focus, Politeness, Quality and Relevance may be seen as concerning the generation of PCIs and the remaining sets that of GCIs, as Levinson suggests (2000: 74). Alternately, politeness may be seen as generated as PCIs and GCIs based on particular contextual assumptions

and/or on form or Manner, respectively; the consensus may, indeed, turn out to be not that there is a separate Politeness Principle which generates implicatures of various sorts, but rather that politeness itself is variously generated by the heuristics or sets of classical maxims. Terkourafi (2001) posits a distinction between politeness which is communicated by means of PCIs from the recognition of speaker's intentions in context, and that which is achieved independently of the recognition of the speaker's intention when an utterance contains an expression which the interlocutors both take to be conventionalized for some use relative to the context. This is, moreover, one might add in its favour, reconcilable with the diachronic view on conventionalization (PCIs can give rise to GCIs and these to conventionalized meanings: see Traugott 1999; Levinson 1979, 2000: 263; Grice 1989: 39; Horn 1984; and with Horn's 2001: 333-336, 338-41 arguments on how his Q- and R-principles (involving Quantity and Manner), in e.g. weakening, hedging, qualifying expressions (e.g. understatement, euphemism), can work to generate politeness).

Either way, the debate on these issues involving politeness seems set to become a growth area in the field in the future⁹.

Among other things, the interplay between politeness, solidarity, intimacy, harmony etc., cooperation and truthfulness will also need to be tackled (see in part and very informally in Vincent 1989, 2004; and also in Wierzbicka 1991).

We shall now take a different tack, and attempt a little concept clarification of some fundamental issues hinted at earlier, and others still to be covered, in the hope that this might provide some further useful signposts.

3. Types of truthfulness and non-truthfulness

As Fraser (1994: 147) says: "People constantly misrepresent in their everyday interactions". There are various ways we all misrepresent or are non-truthful.

By looking at the wider field of 'misrepresentation', as does Fraser, it is easier to get at the different meanings of truthfulness, and resist the tug of seeing 'truthfulness' as simply opposed to 'falsehood' or deception.

Firstly, **non-truthfulness**, or misrepresentation can be classified, as either **unintentional** or **not unintentional**, and the latter category into **neutral** or **intentional misrepresentation**. Cutting across this **not unintentional** category, one

can distinguish between the **intentionally deceptive**, and the **intentionally non-deceptive** (and/or neutral with respect to deceptive intent). A table might help:

Table 1. Types of non-truthfulness or misrepresentation			
Unintentional (unwitting)	Not unintentional		
	Neutral (sub-intentional?) (unavoidable)		Intentional
	neutral as to deceptive intent	intentionally non-deceptive (overt)	intentionally deceptive (covert)

Unintentional non-truthfulness (less relevant to our concern here than the other) can be conceived of in a variety of ways, e.g. as:

- not corresponding to *The Truth*, i.e. supposed metaphysical, transcendental Truth (which all agree) cannot be relevant to ‘truthfulness’ or ‘truth-telling’, since not even the great minds can agree on whether there is ‘Truth’ nor how we might know it. Eco (1997: 38) tells us speakers assume there is truth, that the world is one way rather than another, and ‘work’ with that. That is what truthfulness is measured against.

Readers interested in theories of truth, however, should refer to Kirkham (1995); Soames (1996); Walker (1997); Peregrin (1997); Tennant (1997); Fernandez-Armesto (1997); Taylor (1998); Lynch (2001); Armstrong (2004);¹⁰ ²see also in Williams’ (2002) ‘genealogy’ of truth and truthfulness; or for less technical overviews to Nyberg (1993), Campbell (2001); or for a less authoritative overview, perhaps to Vincent Marrelli (2004: 427–448).

- a speaker’s accidental or unwitting untruth, an error due to ignorance of what s/he would otherwise have accepted as ‘true’ if s/he had perceived or ‘known’ it. For deception studies, at least, intentional rather than accidental misrepresentation, and the intent to mislead, are what are at issue since at least Augustine (*De mendacio* iii, *Contra mendacium* x) and Thomas Aquinas (*Summa Theologica* (ST) II,II q.110 art.1, on the distinction between *material* and *formal* falsehood);¹¹ ³see also e.g. Chisholm & Feehan (1977); Siegler (1966); Adler (1997); Eco (1997);

- that caused by linguistic incompetence of various sorts. See Dascal (1999) on miscommunication/misunderstanding, for general issues, and also Anolli (2002)¹², and the various sorts of unintentional “going wrong in my utterance” which Austin (1970: 138 ff.) and Eco (1997) discuss. Thomas (1994: 74, 1998: 174) characterizes Gricean ‘infringement’ of maxims, as where there is no intention of generating an implicature nor of deceiving, and as coming from imperfect linguistic performance (typical cases would be children or L2 speakers);
- mistakenly perceived untruthfulness or untrustworthiness, for example, that occurring in intercultural contexts, due to mismatching on different levels by interlocutors.

These last two aspects *are* somewhat relevant here, because of the strong possibility of mistaken attribution of in/sincerity in intercultural interaction (see e.g. in Vincent Marrelli 1994, 1997, 2004).

Here our priority focus must be more on all that is *not un-intentional* non-truthfulness, in the above senses. This is an unfortunate but perhaps necessarily roundabout way of saying that *unintentional* misrepresentation is not *simply* opposed to **intentional** misrepresentation, at least when equating intentionality with full consciousness or intent to misrepresent (whether deceptively or not, which we still have to come to). It lets us side-step the distinction, and allows for aspects of interest to pragmatics, social psychology and ethnolinguistics where, for instance, representation, or accurate representation, may not be the point of, or at issue in, the talk (see also the highly useful and insightful Sweetser 1987, whose work is curiously less referred to by deception scholars than it would deserve, on *+Truth relevant* and *-Truth relevant* talk frames or worlds within and across cultures).

It is within this newly understood category of **not-unintentional misrepresentation** or **non-truthfulness**, that it makes sense to focus then on whether or not a speaker also intends thereby (consciously) to *deceive or not*, i.e. whether the misrepresentation is intentionally **covert** or **overt** (intentionally misleading or not); and it would also be important to see that deceptiveness (intentional *covert* misrepresentation) can then be perpetrated either by intentional linguistic manipulation or equivocation or by intentional meaning conveyance manipulation.

- **Overt ‘misrepresentation’**, whether fully consciously intended or not, or fully-recognised by hearers as misrepresentation or not, takes various forms

and occurs by way of various processes but which are not classifiable as intentionally deceptive, although some of the strategies could be said to be intentionally, consciously misrepresentational to some degree (such as irony), while some are perhaps better described as ‘sub-intentional’ (such as underspecification, ‘rounding’, and perhaps also, metaphor, to some degree).

It is all too easy to equate non-truthfulness with intentionality, and, furthermore, intentionality of non-truthfulness with deceptiveness (and that with not-good). This is interesting as a phenomenon in itself. It is also important to realize just how normally we all ‘misrepresent’ non-deceptively. This ‘deconstruction’ of untruthfulness is important from the cross-cultural and intercultural perspective, as a means to avoid folk-classifications and succumbing unwittingly to an ethnocentric or unthinking impulse to look at the issues in facile polar opposition.

It could be useful, at this point, to take a brief look at Grice’s different ways of not observing his maxims, and how these would be involved in generating the different types of non-truthfulness.

- Non-deceptive non-truthfulness is that triggered by ‘**flouting**’ (i.e. *overtly* failing to fulfil a maxim), while by ‘**violating**’ (i.e. *covertly* failing to fulfil) a maxim a speaker is ‘liable to mislead’, i.e. produce deceptive non-truthfulness (see Grice 1989: 30; and the useful Thomas 1995: 72; and Grundy 2000: 75-78).
- ‘**Opting out**’ another overt type (‘my lips are sealed’), is also intentional, and not necessarily deceptive, at least not directly or by ‘commission’ (see 7).

‘**Suspending**’ a maxim, is a type of non-observance added post-Grice (see Thomas 1998; and in §5 below) to account for cases where, for example, the CP or Quality or Quantity maxims are supposedly not in force (and can be misinterpreted as deceptive, at least interculturally - see also in Vincent-Marrelli 2004: 155-163, and in §4 generally for some more detailed discussion of the various effects of not fulfilling the maxims).

- ‘**Infringing**’ occurs through prioritising another maxim when two clash, or through incompetence (as seen earlier), and is thus, at least in the second set of cases, by definition unintentional.

Naturally, of course, one can also *pretend* to be flouting, opting out, infringing too (as when one feigns incompetence so as to escape responsibility), all of them for deceptive purposes. One can, in other words, always manipulate these devices, and other devices, for higher (covert) non communicative goals in Grice's and Castelfranchi & Poggi's (1994, 1998) sense.

Another terminological *caveat* is in order at this point: it is not unusual to see Grice's terms misused or confused. The 'terminological vice-squad' (to echo Haberland 1999) would find many cases of 'flouting' or 'infringing' used when describing what Grice refers to as 'violating', or, more often, 'violating' used when 'flouting' should have been used¹³.

Let us now just give a little flesh to the sub-types which can be classifiable as **neutral** (they are not unwittingly unintentional, and may be best defined as sub-intentional); they are at least neutral with respect to intent to deceive.

- Firstly, I place here what I will call **physiological misrepresentation** or non-strict linguistic 'truthfulness' which is often unavoidable because inherent in the nature of language: this includes phenomena such as vagueness and indeterminacy, or semantic underspecification or semantic generality etc., as well as the fact that 'what is communicated', the 'speaker's meaning', is not fully explicated by 'what is said' (let alone by semantic or linguistic meaning).
- Secondly, this classification could perhaps include those types of talk where degrees of consciousness of belief and intentions (see Mellor 1978, 1980; Vincent Marrelli 1994; Jaszczolt 1999), the **strength of**, or commitment to a **belief or to goals**, are **less than full**, as in, e.g. '**light talk**' (Vincent Marrelli 1994) and meant to be understood as such, with or without the presence of hedging¹⁴. (Communication scholars Anolli et al. 2002 also refer to 'intentional grading' or degrees of intentional stance in their *DeMit (Deceptive Miscommunication Theory)*).
- Lastly, it seems logical to class here, among not-intentional misrepresentation types, those types of talk which are **not 'talk about the world out there'** (in Moerman's words, 1988: 108; see also Sweetser 1987 on *-Truth* relevant worlds), where truthfulness is more or less ir/relevant, where no validity claims for truthfulness of representation are made, and where talk has little to do with representing 'facts'.

This classification, it bears repeating, is hardly intended to be technically watertight¹⁵. It is merely a device for separating out for discussion various ways in which non-truthfulness can be viewed.⁵

Among the decidedly **intentional types of non-truthfulness** (that is, where belief in *p* is perhaps fully conscious and goals fully intended), one can then separate out those which are intended to be **not deceptive** from those which *are meant* to be deceptive or **misleading**:

- On the one hand, we have ***overt non-truthfulness*** which is meant to be understood as having no deceptive or misleading intent, and this is manifestly so (cued or framed somehow), that is, the belief and meaning which H is meant to assume that S wants him to assume as corresponding to her belief and meaning, do correspond, in other words, S's super-goal is not-deceptive. In here we can distinguish between so-called *figurative or non-literal talk* (*metaphor, hyperbole, meiosis or understatement*), envisaged by Grice as generated by 'flouting' of the first Quality maxim, i.e. sub-maxim1, and *playful non-serious talk*, e.g. *irony, joking* (see Vincent-Marrelli 1994), and, also plausibly, *many ritualized social*, and, perhaps, some ego- and alter- face-saving or protective 'lies' where an underlying assumed social contract of 'collusion' for pretending or mutual deception, is doing the cueing, rendering the strategy 'overt', though they could be seen as cases of 'suspension' (see Sweetser 1987 again on 'false non-lies' and *-Truth* relevant contexts; and also Anolli et al. 2002 who adopt a similar schema in part of their *DeMiT*).
- On the other hand, we have **deceptive non-truthfulness**, defined by having a **covert**, non-communicative and intentionally not communicated super-goal (see Vincent & Castelfranchi 1981; Castelfranchi & Vincent 1977/1997; Castelfranchi & Poggi 1994, 1998, for a goals analysis, or intentional plans, approach to deception¹⁶). In this category, we would find lying, and various other strategies with intents to deceive (see also Fraser 1994: 145 for a list of English terms describing different ways- see also). In Grice' terms, this is perpetrated by 'violating' maxims. It bears repeating that deception can be carried out by violating the other maxims too, not only the Quality ones. In this sense, truthfulness and deception are asymmetrical (see below in 7, and, for example, in Vincent Marrelli 2004 for more discussion of deception definitions and strategies).

We shall turn now to examining some of these above types and issues in more detail, maintaining a cross-cultural perspective throughout.

4. Truthfulness and Language – physiological non-truthfulness, non-deceptively intent non-truthfulness

It is perhaps fairly widely accepted at least in principle, although the details are very hotly debated between the various factions at the semantics/pragmatics interface, that, to put it very roughly and informally, pragmatic mechanisms of various sorts appealing to context are needed, on the one hand, to ‘flesh out’ basic sentence meaning, to develop, e.g. the ‘explicatures’ or identify referents and resolve various kinds of vagueness or semantic underdetermination or ambiguity, and thus fully characterize ‘what is said’, and, on the other, to somehow expand, through inference ‘what is said’ into ‘what is communicated’ or ‘meant’. (See Horn 2004, and Wilson & Sperber 2006.)

We shall look very briefly at the first type in 4.1, at the second in 4.3, passing through non-literal figurative language and meaning on the way (4.2).

These questions are usually confined to the technical spheres of pragmatics, yet there are important implications here for intercultural mis/understanding. ‘Physiological’ aspects of language and discourse are essentially below speakers’ and hearers’ consciousness, and considered ‘natural’ by speakers in their discourse worlds. Interculturally, that is across discourse worlds, not only interpretation of intended meanings, but also, more crucially, tacit value judgments on appropriate ways of conveying meaning may conflict. It is, therefore all the more vital to investigate them cross-culturally, in order to reach both theoretically and ‘politically’ valid results. The location of truth and meaning is not of mere technical interest.

4.1 Vagueness, underspecification, looseness, indeterminacy

The literature mentioning vagueness, ambiguity and looseness, rough approximation, fuzziness, indeterminacy, underspecification, generality, etc., is too vast and

intricate to venture into here, nor is it always clear in the literature what the distinctions between them are. Two works that provide useful overviews and which refer in their turn to the previous literature are Keefe & Smith (1999), Keefe (2000) on 'vagueness', and Jaszscolt (1999) who gives focal attention to 'ambiguity' in the characterization of her Default Semantics project. Zhang (1998) usefully considers various terms or phenomena ('fuzziness', 'vagueness', 'generality', 'ambiguity'). For other more recent overviews and works, see Keefe (2003); Cutting ed. (2006); Graff (2003); see also Gross's work (e.g., 2000, 2002; 2006), Weatherson (2005, 2006). Needle (2003/4) provides online an extensive bibliography and links to many articles. For an explicitly intercultural view, see, e.g., Cheng (2006).

Suffice it to say that everyone seems to agree that the phenomena are rife in natural language and that speakers *in their communities* somehow deal with that in communication. There are however different attitudes to them, ranging from those who see them as more or less a 'defect' of language, and disapprove of them, to those who see them as good, or at least 'natural', intrinsic and necessary to its functioning.

Jaszscolt's insights, furthermore, can provide here a quick useful distinction: a *sentence* may be *linguistically* underspecified but an *utterance's meaning* will not be *semantically* underspecified, since hearers 'jump' to the 'default meaning', without contemplating others, with the help of context, including culturally specific orientations to the default (1999: 7).

Since this type of linguistic misrepresentation is essentially a question of economy of encoding, letting shared context do a lot of the work for speaker and hearer, it would not be appropriate to call it intentional misrepresentation, nor would it be *taken to be* misrepresenting anything, for example, when rounding numbers (in talking about distances) or using, say, a basic colour term instead of a more specific one, unless *it mattered*, that is, a greater degree of precision or specificity was *relevant* to the context or to the hearer (see also Wittgenstein MS 162b 69v: 19.8.1940, 1999: p.45e; and e.g. Keefe & Smith 1999: 29). The problem *is*, however, that some cultures, and sub-cultures within cultures, will naturally round to a greater degree than others and in different contexts (for example, with Time; one need only think of different values for punctuality, the different leeway for being 'on time' or 'kept waiting', across cultures - see e.g. in Hall 1983 and Levine 1997; and see Van der Henst, Carles & Sperber 2002 on rounding in telling the time¹⁷). This can cause considerable intercultural friction.

Various different appeals, indeed, to ‘first accessible interpretation’ (Wilson 1997), ‘default interpretations’ (Jaszcolt 1999), ‘preferred’ or ‘presumptive interpretations’ (Levinson 2000), seem promising (leaving aside their differences) as ways to cope with explaining cross-cultural differences in ‘default’ meanings of looseness or precision, or of epistemic strength in unhedged statements.

Regarding the methodological issues concerning underlying principles governing understanding, it is worth briefly mentioning (no more can be attempted here) that the reason Wilson (1997) takes specific issue with Grice’s purported ‘truthfulness’ maxim, is because according to her it “posits a rather simple relationship between utterances and thoughts [...] [telling] us that the proposition *literally* expressed by an utterance should be *identical* to a belief of the *speaker’s*...” (1997: 68; see Wilson & Sperber 2002, and Wilson & Sperber 2006, for more recent discussions).

4.2 *Metaphor: sub-intentional?, non-deceptively intent nontruthfulness*

Wilson’s objection to the ‘truthfulness maxim’ is also connected to the purported ‘distorted’ way Grice’s apparatus would account for figurative speech (e.g. metaphor, for her a ‘variety of rough approximation’), by having it reached through ‘violating’ [sic] the maxim; see also in Wilson & Sperber 2006: 5). Discounting her use of ‘violating’ instead of ‘flouting’, here, and without needing to espouse her general critique of the model, nor agree that Grice meant ‘literal truthfulness’ by this first maxim, the point is well taken that hearers do not find the interpretation of metaphors problematic.

However, there are different ‘cultural’ attitudes to metaphor and figurative speech in general. Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 186 ff.; 1999) and Lakoff (1987: 294f), for example, critique the objectivist ‘myth’ as pernicious or ‘insidious’, since it presupposes its own absolute superiority and thus, for example, that literal truth is better than metaphor, that speaking directly is better than indirectly, that somehow there is something wrong with people who use words which do not directly and literally reflect ‘reality’ or their thoughts. They also argue that epistemological, linguistic, sociological theories, etc. may be seen as so many different competing local folk theories, ideologies, or ‘myths’ (1999: 118 ff.). Scollon & Scollon’s (1995: 98 ff.) account, furthermore, of the Utilitarian discourse system shows that it

assumes *clarity, brevity, sincerity* (CBS) as the best way of communicating, and has among its ideal characteristics that of being *anti-rhetorical* (loc.cit: 107). The ethos expressed in Wilkins (1668: B1 recto), and that to some extent, essentially behind the Plain English movement (Gowers 1954) are also of this ilk (see also Eco 1993; Cameron 1995, and comments in Vincent-Marrelli 2004: 96, 139, 150, 328).

It is worth mentioning here the probable originators of the pejorative view of less or more than strict truth, although some of their followers took it to morally untempered extremes arguably not contemplated by them. Aristotle (*Nich.Ethica*. Bk.II 7, Bk. IV.7) famously classifies *hyperbole* (i.e. ‘boasting’) and ‘irony’ (or, for some translators, *litotes*, *meiosis* or ‘understatement’) as strictly *non-truthful* because they are more or less, respectively, than the mean, and therefore ‘virtue’, of truthfulness (Augustine *Summa* II,II, q.110 art.2). Augustine and Aquinas, following ‘The Philosopher’, see metaphor, hyperbole, irony and jokes¹⁸ as technically ‘unnatural’ or ‘inordinate’ (i.e. not strictly representing a speaker’s thought or believed reality as language should (see Aquinas *q.109, art.2* on order as good, and the sign to signified relation as special order), and therefore ‘essentially’ as lies (though not grievous or mortal sins, unless they have evil aims and effects – see §7). Yet even they also say explicitly that there is nothing wrong with speaking figuratively, at least; it is not lying, because there is no intention to deceive, and it is not taken by hearers to be intentionally misrepresentative or misleading of a speaker’s thought: “because every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify” (see Aquinas *Summa* II, II, 110, 3, who quotes Augustine *De Mend.* V).

4.3 Open-endedness, indirectness, ambiguity and context

To contemplate the cross-cultural aspect again, this time with respect to the ‘in-principle open-endedness of utterances’, and the non-problematicity for some cultures of indeterminacy and indirectness, McHoul (1994: 198), while considering different culture/languages’ assumptions on underlying principles of (joint) construction of meaning, tells us that “some communities can work towards *an opening and dispersal* of indexical particulars such that ambiguity, inconclusiveness, and so on, would be *required and expected outcomes of competent communication*”

(emphasis added). This is essentially Chang's (1999) point too; see also Zhang (1998). See also the numerous comments in the cross-cultural pragmatics and intercultural interaction literatures on indirectness, e.g. in Hall (1976), Wierzbicka (1991), and also in Yeung et al. (1999), Lee et al. (2001), Fu et al. (2001).

In some cultures, meaning can, and must 'properly' be jointly constructed (see Duranti 1993; Moerman 1988: 101–104) from and in the context; to presume to fix it or possess it without the hearer having a part in it would be improper (akin to the idea of 'reader/hearer-responsibility' cultures (Hinds 1987), while other cultures see speakers as responsible for and 'possessing' meaning. In 'hearer-responsibility' cultures, indirectness is thus valued, while in speaker-responsibility ones it is disvalued; a speaker must 'say what s/he means and mean what s/he says' and indirectness will tend to be seen as devious, evasive. In some 'indirect' societies, Machiavellian intelligence is indeed a valued social skill, or 'empathy' is, which helps you to work out what the other is probably feeling, wanting or intending (often said especially of Japanese culture, for example; see Wierzbicka 1991: 87, 93–95 on these points; see also Markus & Kitayama 1991). The 'Machiavellian' type, furthermore, which favours the social survival of the quick-witted, labels people naive or foolish, or rude (or even hypocritical¹⁹), if they insist on direct expression and interpretation, and nit-picking and ridiculously over fussy if they insist on specifying everything and not 'rounding' quantities, for instance, unless it is absolutely necessary (see also Vincent Marrelli 1994 and 2004).

While we await the outcome of the theoretical debates, we can already be content with some of the basic insights, for example that meaning does not reside in a speaker's words alone, but is also left to the interplay with context (see also Hall's 1976 distinction between High and Low Context cultures and codes). What is truth-evaluable in interpersonal terms can be 'what is not said, but is understood', rather than 'what is said'. This is especially interesting (and timely in theoretical musings) because there are many cultures, the South-Italian, and the Chinese for example, where this has always been obvious to everyone (in that they are meta-discursively well aware of it).

George (1990), for example, discusses discourse practices in Naples and elsewhere and the different assignment of truthfulness²⁰ to, for example, promising, and "the different attitudes to illocutionary points of types of speech acts. She considers whether and how they are used indirectly for 'something else' in the

Neapolitan culture. Discussing in particular assertives, commissives and expressives, she concludes: “A hearer (in Naples) needs to 1) contextualise the assertive in order to ascertain its value- to assess whether it is likely to be true or false depending on the place within the network of alliances of the speaker and hearer, 2) delay the assignment of value to the commissives depending on future discourse moves, and 3) to seek directive intent behind the expression of attitudes to propositions. (George 1990:170 ff.).

In short, and put another way, some speakers/cultures/hearers, as well as scholars, will be ‘contextualists’ (of various strengths), and some will be ‘literalists’, some ‘meaning-maximalists’, some ‘minimalists’ (see, e.g., in Turner 1997: 3-4).

5. Truthfulness and Talk: Is truthfulness always ‘relevant’ to the talk? Is sincerity always expected?

The philosopher Austin (1970: 130-131) thought it obvious that statements did not *only* aim to be true, and even speculated that statements themselves might *not always* aim to be true *at all*. Ethnologists and ethnolinguists, and ethnomethodologists, take us a little further along the road to destabilizing truth on its throne as *the* criterion for judging talk, by seeing the constraint of truth not as a “property of *language* but as one placed by the organisation of speaking and by speakers” (Moerman 1988: 108). Moreover, “it is not omnirelevant [...] Even if we restrict our attention to talk about the world out there, truth and accuracy are not always the relevant or appropriate standards. Being amusing, touching or polite sometimes counts too” (*ibid.*). “Truth is sometimes an achievement as much as a precondition for a satisfactory transaction, communication included” (Duranti 1997: 230), “a resource to be negotiated over” (Moerman 1988: 108; see also Wierzbicka 1991: 100-102, on Geertz’s comments on no need to give ‘gratuitous truths’ in Java (nor have any malicious intent behind untruths, either). Lindstrom (1992), using Foucault’s approach, also sees truth (in Vanuatu) as locally achieved, as a ‘contest’ where a show of power (and the right to define truth) are more relevant than objective truth in the talk. Sweetser (1987), as mentioned earlier, had already made the insightful and clear distinction between + *Truth relevant* and –*Truth relevant* frames or worlds, which has curiously been less referred to than it deserved (though communication scholars Anolli et al. 2002: 78, seem to have taken it on board).

Speech Act Theory postulations of sincerity conditions were strongly critiqued, also with ethnographic and ethnolinguistic data (again from the Pacific area) by Rosaldo (1982), and in Duranti (1997: 227f). Rosaldo argued that they cannot be considered to be a universal basis in verbal interaction.

Familiar 'axioms' from earlier sociolinguistic work do concern, after all, the existence of different 'functions' of language in different contexts, talk or speech genres, speech activity types, forms of talk, different types of relationship between people, the pursuance of different goals (e.g. of 'comity', see Aston 1988) etc., 'even' in Western cultures. One can easily lose sight of this²¹ when immersed in the abstract philosophical and semantic literature on truth and/or truthfulness, though one might remember Wittgenstein's 'language games' (1999: e.g. s.23-24: 11-12). Solidarity and trust may be based on non-harmfulness and 'truth-of-mood' (see Forster 1924; and Vincent Marrelli 1989) rather than on 'truth of words'.

The classic Brown & Levinson (1987) negative and positive politeness strategies are also readily seen as examples of misrepresentation, even of deception by omission and commission, respectively (see also Saarni & Lewis 1993: 14-15 on changing attitudes to 'etiquette' as 'deception' in the US society).

The value of jokes, irony and teasing are also open to negotiation. Indeed, their so-called overt non-seriousness may not be recognized or obvious or accepted by all hearers (see, e.g., Giora, 2001). So too is that of the degree of commitment to one's beliefs and goals, and caring about issues, and convincing people (not to mention that of the accuracy of representing reality). One can see 'light talk' in Naples, characterized by these shifting values, as allowing for, needing, their negotiation in any particular context. Default looseness, or vagueness can also be contextually negotiated to suit the shifting context and goals of speakers and hearers. This fluidity, ambiguity, uncertainty of value, functionally efficient in its own cultural matrices, can cause 'grief' in intercultural communication (Vincent Marrelli 1994; see Hofstede 1994 on his UAI (uncertainty avoidance index) values for different cultures²²).

Sincerity, itself, or disclosure of information, may simply not be expected of interlocutors in important contexts. Besides the Pacific area (Rosaldo 1982), and in Madagascar (Ochs 1976), in traditional (poor) Naples (Borrelli 1969) it is specifically considered naive to be trusting (especially of strangers). Only a fool expects total sincerity, and only a fool (a presumptuous one) or a hypocrite professes to be sincere or speak the truth (see also Vincent Marrelli 1994:265; George 1990).²³

‘Indeed in many cultures those who are tolerated when they speak out the truth are somehow special or ‘protected’ - fools, saints, ‘jokers’ and comedians, and small children until they become ‘socialized’.

In a culture with no respect for self-righteousness (that is, of taking oneself seriously and thinking ‘truth’ can be ‘cornered’ or pinned down anyway), and one where it is assumed that the powerless have only their wits as defence against the powerful, who have only *their* own interests at heart, then diffidence is the wisest bet. You only let down your guard when you have enough evidence that the other has your interests at heart somehow. Even then, literal truthfulness (deceptive or otherwise) and directness may hardly ever be expected, and ulterior motives usually attributed to whatever is said (see also Pardo 1996).

The deemed pejorative effects of saying the truth, as in ‘truth-dumping’ (as Bok 1989 calls it), and the need to conceal information or feelings (dissimulate, dissemble feelings), which crucially hinges on the use of indirection (as face-saving), are notably discussed by Wierzbicka (1991: 88f) with all due caveats on the directness/indirectness distinction itself. However, a manifestation of negative feelings, even of ill-will, and direct confrontation, and/or of ‘direct’ or ‘straight talk’ is not necessarily negative nor impolite in all cultures. Wierzbicka characterizes (1991: 89 ff.) Israeli culture as relatively ‘direct’. She also, talking of misguided universalism, or Anglocentric illusions in much theorizing about interaction, critiques Leech’s (1983: 132) purported universal maxims of harmony and agreement as suggested in his principle of ‘minimise disagreement, maximise agreement’. Jewish culture displays a clear preference for disagreement (see Wierzbicka 1991: 68; Schifffrin 1984; Tannen 1981, and 1999: 216-243 specifically comparing cultures on ‘argument’). This love of argument, in Jewish society, which may incidentally be non-representative of what a person really feels, is argument which signals involvement and interest, and is thus in the service of sociability. It does not, therefore, undermine the idea of cooperation between people. In South Italy, arguments can have this function, though they are often just ‘ritual’, or debates between friends which can seem strong, even acrimonious (to the outsider), but are in this case ultimately ‘light’, non-committal with goals, without touching fundamental opinions and hopes. Those who mistake this for a true investment of issues are typically ridiculed. Again, it may also be the case that they are intentionally ambiguous, their ‘field value’ open to negotiation or determination in the context.

6. Is truthfulness necessary for cooperation?

So, is assuming each other's truthfulness necessary to understand each other and/or to achieve social order? As said earlier, there is a considerable confusion of ethical and coordination issues. The ambiguity, not to say loaded nature of the labels given to the principles mentioned above (such as 'charity', 'humanity', etc.) are, plausibly, largely responsible for this confusion, as Thomas (1998: 176) also says of Grice's use of 'cooperative'.

To cut a very long story as short as possible, and referring the reader to Morpugo-Tagliabue (1981), Gu (1994), McHoul (1994), Thomas (1998), Castelfranchi & Poggi (1998: 99-101), Parret (1997), Gumperz 1990 (and the other contributors to the *BLS 16* parasession on 'the legacy of Grice'), there is some confusion on the issue of whether Grice's CP and the other principles are prescriptive, or descriptive or wishful thinking. For Grice, of course, the CP was none of these, but simply an attempt at explaining what rational assumptions might be operating (see again Horn 2004:7, quoted earlier). Moreover, there is much dispute on whether they are to be interpreted as having to do with *linguistic goal sharing* or *real-world goal sharing* (as Thomas says) or on which different levels of cooperation they can be seen to be operating. Gu (1994: 180 ff.) distinguishes very profitably between 'pragmatic' and the higher 'rhetorical' cooperation, and Parret (1997) constructs an impressive general picture incorporating also the other, Humean, Quinean and Davidsonian, principles.

Gu (1994), using a goals-analysis approach, speaks of three attitudes to the Gricean CP: denialists, reductionists, and expansionists. What the denialists are denying is that one needs real-world-goal sharing for interpretation (the boy-scout' or 'honourable guy view', 'who always says the right thing and really means it' is seen as resting on a profoundly false conception of the nature of social life). However, it does seem clear that Grice has been misunderstood. Even in the case of Ochs (1976), automatically cited for years as disproving Grice's model, her work, on closer reading, can be seen to be only arguing for taking the local context into account, where truth (new information) can actually be seen as so valuable (or dangerous) that it is expected to be withheld, and must be eked out. No one is deceived, *intraculturally*. Incidentally, it is the Quantity rather than the Quality maxims which Ochs discusses. 'Suspension' of the maxims is postulated these days to account for

this type of non observance of maxims (see Thomas 1998), rather than as seeing it as invalidating the CP apparatus.

In the end, most writers, supporters and critics, accept the need for *linguistic-goal-sharing*, at least at the first semantic, linguistic level. In other words, linguistic cooperation is assumed, rhetorical cooperation and goal sharing-adoption must be achieved (see Gu 1994: 182).

As Grice (1989: 370), Gu (1994) and Gumperz (1990) say, even the detective and suspect, or judge and criminal in the courtroom under cross-examination need to have some basic procedures in common, otherwise they would not even be able, if so intent, to deceive each other or pursue conflicting goals on the higher level. When you do not want to communicate at all, you invent different languages. Steiner (1976: 232) interprets a 'somewhat cryptic' remark by Nietzsche (1873) as making this point. Castelfranchi & Poggi (1998: 99 ff.) also remind us commonsensically that for lying to succeed you need to understand what the other says or implies. If everyone lied, language would indeed be inefficient, pointless, according to them; it would lose its usefulness, but not its meaning.

Conflict (and/or concealment for various reasons), as mentioned earlier, may be seen as achievement but also even as part of what is taken for granted (see McHoul 1994: 198; Nyberg 1993: 72; Steiner 1976; and also indeed Ochs 1976). And if this is so, mistrust can hardly be seen as subversive of social order, nor can truthfulness be universally said to be a prerequisite for interactive coordination (at least not on the 'rhetorical' level, to use Gu's term).

Societies are being increasingly described, indeed, where deception itself works collaboratively in function of the code of honour, where truthfulness is paid lip-service to (see e.g. Harris 1996), or, where what is happening is perhaps what Grice meant (1989: 370) by "the joint enterprise is a simulation [... of] conversational cooperation; but such exchanges honor the cooperative principle at least to the extent of aping its application".

For Harris (1996) deception like this does not necessarily contradict the assumption that there is an underlying assumption that truth is a value, or that truthfulness is considered morally superior in principle. Furthermore, it may also be that what counts more even than sincerity, is appearing to be so, or manifesting, or simply acting as if, one were being sincere, as a manifest orientation to and valuing of the propriety of behaviour. It is important to simulate them if you don't have them.

By their very appearance and enactment (whether sincere or insincere) one does the right thing: by apologizing, offering hospitality, thanking, showing deference, etc. Indeed, the very fact, that one has simulated, pretended, acted *as if*, is itself appreciated; it shows one's respect for the social order, respect for what it is that binds a community, and therefore *is* an (appreciated) act of cooperation. What counts more is social harmony, which is best achieved through demonstrations of conforming to the norms, rather than by genuine 'truthfulness' or sincerity (see e.g. in Harris 1996, and elaborated on here thinking of traditional Neapolitan culture). Hofstede (1994: 159) reports remarks made by Pradhan, a Hindu Nepalese anthropologist, that what counts in his culture is appearances rather than beliefs, in opposition to what he found during his field research in a Dutch village. Without becoming too exotic, however, it is also at work, arguably, in *all* those societies with ritualized deference systems (even on the simple level of T/V pronouns of address and differentiated personal address terms: all cultures presumably). It is also at work in 'etiquette', where in order to behave 'properly' (when behaviour is 'prescribed or predetermined' socially) we are "allowed to act quite independently of how we feel or think" (see Saarni & Lewis 1993: 14).

Centre-stage, morally, would not be truth/truthfulness, nor sincerity even, but caring for people, or at least social reality, rather than for facts or beliefs; or simply in some cases (and less rosily), collaboration or colluding together in social survival, by managing social reality (the third Habermasian type of reality).

7. Intentionally deceptive non-truthfulness – deception and lying: definitions and moral evaluations

7.1 Ways – general classifications and characteristics

There are 869 different forms of lying, but only one of them has been squarely forbidden. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor. (Mark Twain 1897:LV)

The reverse of truth has a hundred thousand shapes and a limitless field. (Montaigne, cited by Nyberg 1993:54)

Let us now consider issues specific to the covert or intentionally conflictual and deceptive type of non-truthfulness. General classifications and

underlying issues are provided especially by writers from various disciplines, such as Siegler (1966); Chisholm & Feehan (1977); Castelfranchi & Vincent (1977/1997); Parret (1980); Barton Bowyer (1982); Coleman & Kay (1981); Sweetser (1987); Bok (1999); Bavelas et al. (1990); Nyberg (1993); Barnes (1994); Fraser (1994); Martone (1991); Castelfranchi & Poggi (1998); Anolli et al. (2002); Vincent Marrelli (2004: 169-220, 221-245). General overviews and definitions can also be found among the various articles in the collections by Saarni & Lewis (eds.) (1993), Parret ed. (1994), Mack ed. (1996), Bonfantini et al. (eds.) (1997); and in, e.g. Bok (1999: 13-16) and Barnes (1994: 10-19), for example, also discuss definitions. We can begin by looking at different classifications of various aspects of lying and deception.

There are various types of categorization or classification of types of deception to be found, and thus approaches to definitions. The field is also fairly confused, with much mixing of issues, or at least not explicitly clear attention to the type of classification being used. Moreover, though only a little less confusingly, some discussions concern only lying, specifically, or issues concerned with lying are incorporated within a more general discussion on deception²⁴ and/or the various ways it can be perpetrated and/or the (folk names, lexical labels) names given to its various types in any one language.

Features focussed on when classifying types of deception (and/or lying) range, loosely, from medium used, type of cognitive and/or linguistic strategy, type of effect on information, or mode of information manipulation, to speaker's goals and motivations and effects on victims. Bavelas et al. (1990: 171-2) see this as reflecting a weakness in deception research, none of the conceptual or operational definitions able to consistently distinguish deceptive from non-deceptive messages. Anolli et al. (2002) see this as 'natural', since miscommunication (deceptive and otherwise) and 'default' communication are part of the same system (and, roughly, its the contextual features which say which when communication is miscommunication, and whether it is deception or not²⁵). For Bavelas et al. (op cit), informational criteria (e.g. misrepresentation of information, and thus message design) should be the basis for distinguishing deceptive from non-deceptive messages, instead, as they say, most researchers bring in also "non-informational criteria such as motivation, justification, or effects of the message", according even to their ethical judgments, thus variously including or excluding different categories of practices/or terms, as 'lying' (op.cit. 172-4). While it would certainly seem right to sort out what classification principles are being used, it would not be as right, I believe, to exclude

non-informational criteria. 'Lying' is a folk concept, as is any category labelled by a particular language, not a universal one (unless proven to be by crosscultural investigation), and, furthermore, it *is* ethically loaded (even (especially), in English), and thus, to be valid must surely also entertain cultural and ethical elements in its definition/s; furthermore, as we have argued earlier, and as even semanticists such as Sweetser (1987) have postulated, there are different discourse worlds, contexts or frames (within and across cultures) where statements are not taken (seriously) i.e. to be assertions of facts/belief with the concomitant responsibility or commitment to the truth of what is being said. Furthermore, generations of (philosophical) thinkers have seen fit to distinguish between information or facts, knowledge or belief of those facts, and intention to deceive by misrepresenting facts and/or beliefs (it is not clear whether this, however, was intended to be excluded by their call for focussing formally only on informational criteria; perhaps not). One can perhaps identify departures or distance-from-the-truth (as believed by a speaker?), by formal informational criteria, but one cannot call them or 'lying' or even 'deception', until others have come in, such, at least, as whether an informational or + *Truth* relevant frame is in place) not in any culture (I contend), and certainly not universally (see, e.g., Yeung et al, 1999; Lee et al. 2001; and below, on emerging data on how different cultures characterise the concept of lying differently). The danger is yet again ultimately also one of assuming that a particular culture (the one with the word 'lying in its lexicon) be considered the default culture against which others are measured (if informational criteria turned out to be sufficient for *it*).

With these provisos, let us now briefly mention some of the classifications and characteristics that are to be found of deception (i.e. when an informative + *Truth* relevant context is assumed by interlocutors). Bavelas et al.'s (op. cit.) call for order in sorting out the criteria, and for recognizing the multidimensional (and confused) nature of intuitive (or technical) conceptions of deception is certainly not misplaced. Thus, a little order will be attempted (though with no guarantee of non-fuzziness and overlap) by first considering the, by now classic elements of speaker intentions and goals (for lying or deception to be basically identified as such), then by looking at suggested classifications of *hows*, firstly at what we might call macro-classifications of deception *hows* (how believed true information can be hidden or false information given), and then at micro-ways (verbal -or non-verbal) *hows* or ways through which deception can be perpetrated. Finally an idea classification schemes of *whys* (logical and motivational) of the *hows* will be mentioned.

The first set, are basically ‘intentional’ and found when discussing ‘lying’ in particular. Lying/deception are said, by different authors, to have the following various characteristics:

“Lying involves an express indication one is expressing one’s own opinion” (Chisholm & Feehan 1977: 149). An assertion implies commitment and responsibility for having expressed *p*, and an explicit invitation to B to place faith in A (see also in Habermas).

For Nyberg (1993: 47), a lie has four parts:

- a statement;
- a belief in the mind of statement maker;
- an intention;
- the character and rights of the person addressed (as we can see this is not unmixed).

For Castelfranchi & Poggi they are:

- S’s belief of non-truth of *p*;
- intention to deceive H;
- relevance to H.²⁶

Further nuances come in when considering strength or degrees of belief (see Mellor 1978, 1980), and that of withholding belief; A does not believe *p* and does not believe not-*p* (Chisholm & Feehan 1977: 145). Nyberg (1993: 50) gives a further definition with yet more elements involved to nuance it appropriately: “lying means making a statement (not too vague) you want somebody to believe, even though you don’t (completely) believe it yourself, when the other person has a right to expect you mean what you say”.

A further methodological point needs stressing, to return to the ‘invitation to accept *p*’. One may understand *p*, the proposition the S is offering as her truth, but not accept it, or ‘adopt’ it (in goals’ analysis terminology; see also Gu 1994). Furthermore, believing S, i.e. perceiving her sincerity, and believing her proposition *p*, i.e. accepting her *p* as true or as ‘genuine’ information, are also different. Assuming S’s truthfulness or sincerity about *p*, does not render the truth of *p*, but only of S’s propositional attitude as expressed about *p*. To adopt someone’s *p* is to trust them (assume they are sincere) *and* to credit them with authority (of having sufficient evidence for asserting that *p*) so that you perceive you can safely use them

as a proxy source of knowledge about reality. One adjusts trust to “every combination of communicator, situation and topic” (Sperber 2000).

The above suggested characteristics are the result of speculation and introspection . The characteristics of lying have also been experimentally investigated, in particular, in the US.

Coleman & Kay (1983) (and see also Sweetser’s 1987 work), identified the prototypical elements of the English word/concept ‘lie’, by asking (N. American) subjects to classify stories or vignettes of situations illustrating these elements in different combinations. In descending order of priority or centrality to the concept which emerged, they are:

- speaker believes the statement is false
- speaker intends to deceive hearer by making it
- the statement is false.

If all three are present, subjects have no problem identifying the case as ‘lying’. Different combinations of these features in a given situation determine more or less uncertainty in subjects as to the classification as ‘lies’ of the statements and thus also helps to distinguish pure lies from indirect ones.

To turn, now, roughly, to some classifications of *hows*.

Philosophers Chisholm & Feehan (1977) (also reported and adapted in Parret 1980; Nyberg 1993: 94) have suggested a very influential classification, one according to the difference between *commission* and *omission*, analogous to the older *suggestio falsi* vs *suppressio veri* (see Sidgwick’s (1902) discussion concerning the ‘duty’ of ‘veracity’). The table below schematises the Chisholm & Feehan distinctions:

Table 2. Chisholm & Feehan’s (1977) distinctions		
Commission	(p is ‘false’ for A)	Omission
(a) A causes belief of p in B (acquisition of false) (‘lying’)	Positive deception simpliciter	(e) A allows B to acquire belief in p
(b) A causes B’s continuance of belief in p (not loss of false belief p)	Positive deception secundum quid	(f) A allows B to continue in belief in p
(c) A causes B ceasing to believe not-p (loss of true belief)	Negative deception simpliciter	(g) A allows B to lose belief in not-p

Table 2. Chisholm & Feehan's (1977) distinctions		
Commission	(p is 'false' for A)	Omission
(a) A causes belief of p in B (acquisition of false) ('lying')	Positive deception simpliciter	(e) A allows B to acquire belief in p
(d) A prevents B from acquiring belief in not-p	Negative deception secundum quid	(h) A allows B to continue without belief in not-p

We shall be mentioning the different opinions pertaining to the moral evaluation of these types in 8. Nyberg's 'hiding and showing' distinction touches on some of the same distinctions. Hiding: by vanishing, disguising, distracting; showing: by mimicing, counterfeiting, misdirecting (1993: 67-73; see also Barton Bowyer for the set of distinctions), and similarly to Castelfranchi & Poggi's more detailed description of the general strategies and modes of interference mentioned below. Anolli et al. 2002: 76, in their *DeMiT* distinguish, between a) omission, b) concealment, c) falsification, d) masking. These all suggest too that deception is more like 'selective display' and/or 'editing the truth', rather than denying it altogether.

Anderson provides a neat clarification of the general picture, when she distinguishes semiotic modes, analogical and digital, and moreover, reminds us, in simple terms that deception can be (digitally) verbally perpetrated lexically, semantically, pragmatically, and non-verbally through gesture, and (analogically), through feigning, masquerading, etc.

Castelfranchi & Poggi (1998) also usefully give a general systematic grid or 'road-map', also in information theory terms, the ways that a cognitive processes can be deceived, by going through the types of interference/intervention that can be perpetrated on the cognitive process at various loci, internal and external to the victim's mind: by depriving it of TK or preventing it from acquiring (true knowledge, TK), and by giving it FK (by 'deviationary' means) hiding and pretending, respectively are two main categories of deception strategies which correspond to the two main ways of interference. The external loci being interfered with in various ways they also systematically describe, can be the stimulus, the channel and/or the perceptual apparatus of the victim (see Vincent Marrelli 2004).

Eco (1997), distinguishes between lying (which involves the referent) and falsifying (forging, counterfeiting, or producing 'fakes'), and in this category between 'historical' and 'diplomatic' falsifying or forgery. The *first*, 'lies' as to contents/the referent (a false/fake document which asserts something which is not true;

the *second*, 'lies' more about the authorship, or the circumstances of authorship (a fabricated document asserting the truth of the matter, or a counterfeit coin or a fake Picasso, although these types also embed a lie on the contents). 'Diplomatic' fakes involve the complex concept of authenticity. Austin (1970) makes, among others, similar points on types of pretending.

Linking the general level of *hows* to that of (rational) *whys*, Castelfranchi & Poggi (1998) identify six general strategies of *hows*, from weaker to stronger: (1) Omission, (2) Concealment of something, (3) (pure) falsification, (4) false confirmation, (5) negation, (6) masking, which they distinguish, according to the *whys* or logical/rational strategies/calculations speakers make as to intended victims' beliefs, future moves, and the probabilities of their coming to know the 'truth' otherwise, thus justifiably also linking these levels to that of S (and presumed H) beliefs, goals and intentions. There are at least four possibilities a S must entertain: a) H has a F belief about x; b) H does not have a T belief (Tb) about x, nor a F belief- he has none either way; there are two sub-cases to b) entertain here: i) H does not have a Tb about x, and it is improbable that H will come to acquire it; ii) H doesn't have a Tb about x, and if S does nothing to avoid it, it is probable that H will sooner or later acquire Tb of x; c) H already has a Tb of x (one that S does not want him/her to have). The combination of S's goals, the ways of deceiving, the (S's assumed) state of H's mind about x, and the S's assumed probability of H's acquiring Tb of x, gives rise to 16 possible situations. (for which see Castelfranchi & Poggi 1998: 164 ff. ; and also Vincent Marrelli 2004: 193-197).

Coming now briefly to the more micro-*hows*, the digital verbal level, and specifically to the pragmatic one, we can report Fraser's (1994) classification of deceptive strategies according to *direct/explicit* means (lying), *indirect means* (i.e. by inference, for example, by allusion, suggestion, insinuation), and by *implicit means* (by entailment, presupposition, and standard implicature).

It would also be instructive to systematically look at how different types of linguistic non-observance of the different categories of the Gricean maxims can generate different types of non-truthfulness. There is no space for that here but the reader can easily do so (e.g. by following Grundy 2000: 70-79; see for a more extended attempt Vincent-Marrelli 2004: 111-167). Let us also just remember that violation of *all* the different maxims can produce deceptive effects. The English 'oath of truthfulness' itself, committing one to say 'the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth' involves not only the maxims of Quality (the accuracy

and sincerity aspects of it) but also the various sub-maxims in the Quantity, Manner and Relation categories. The *Information Manipulation Theory* (IMT) work within the communication studies field known as ‘deception studies’ (following Bavelas et al. 1990; see McCornack 1992), explicitly uses a (rather) simplified Gricean set of maxims to classify types of departures from the truth²⁷: they simply classify, and name, violations of the Gricean ‘maxims’ (sic) as follows: of Quality: as *Falsification*; of Quantity as *Omission*; of Manner as *Equivocation*, and of Relation as *Evasion*. Other scholars, in other areas of communication studies, are also investigating *attitudes* to departures from truth and to lying in general, to see what other variables, apart from *information manipulation* itself, enter into judgements of deceptiveness, and its acceptability; for example Lee et al. (2001), Seiter et al. (2002); Seiter et al. (2002). Coleman and Kay had revealed some of this for US subjects, as had Sweetser 1987, while looking for prototypical definitions of ‘lying’, among US students. (See also Vincent Marrelli (2004: §5) for a more detailed exposition and discussion of classifications and aspects of lying and deception).

Castelfranchi & Poggi (*op. cit*) also distinguish between three types of deliberate equivocation: (1) referential mendacious ambiguity, (2) semantic, and (3) cryptic.

Castelfranchi & Poggi’s (1998) and Vincent & Castelfranchi’s (1981) earlier contribution to the study of deception *hows*, was versed specifically in the goals analysis of deception strategies, the intentional plan followed by a S (incorporating earlier only presumed assumptions of H’s beliefs). (see more below on the section on indirect ways or *hows*). They give goals analyses of different strategies such as lying, pretending, pretending to lie, pretending to joke, as well as insinuation, allusion, presupposition faking, etc.

Other (micro) ‘digital’ verbal *hows* such as by lexical manipulation, are discussed typically in works (by linguists and others) on double-speak, nuke-speak, pentagonese, etc., and the cosmetic use of obscure language, etc (see Vincent Marrelli 2004 for some examples, and references).

To come now to the *whys*, Castelfranchi & Poggi (1994), as we saw, classify deceptive strategies also, according to the *rational whys* or *reasons* for choosing indirect ones specifically (1998: 226 ff.). These can be seen to be of two types: logical or rational (as mentioned earlier) based on contextual adaptation and calculations of the other’s knowledge and probability of coming to know the truth, and also motivational, i.e. ranging from ego- to alter- protective ones). An ‘ends’

or motivational classification is also found in LaFrenière (1988) who lists the various observed developmental stages (from 19 months to 8 years) of different types of lying: from *playful*, *defensive*, *aggressive*, *competitive*, to *protective*. The original model for ‘ends’ classifications of deception are those typically found in ethical or religious discussions (e.g. by Augustine *De Mend.*, Aquinas *Summa* II,II, ques. 110 art.2-4, when discussing the relative gravity or sinfulness of types of lies: *officious*, *jocose* and *mischievous* (‘evil’) - see 8 below). Fu et al. (2001) and Seiter et al. (2002) explicitly address and investigate, experimentally, social variables in the definition of lies and so so, moreover, cross-culturally. Considerations of motivations, are inextricably tied to ethical concerns- but shall take a view contrary to Bavelas et al.’s objection that these thus have no place in formally defining lying or deception. We shall be addressing these issues in 8, and thus merely mention them here.

A further distinction, adopting Conversation Analysis methodology, ought to be made between non-truth offered as first move, as against its being given in response to another’s questioning or request. This is not made explicitly anywhere, to my knowledge. Yet, quite apart from instrumental and structural implications (different ‘ways’ or *hows* will fit according to whether they are first or second or third moves), moral evaluations would also hinge on this, variously classifying non-truthtelling as aggressive, defensive or protective use (of privacy, for example, or safety), etc.

7.2 *Ways - indirect lying, or lying while saying the truth, lying by implicit means - ‘half-truths’*

A few more words, are worth dedicating now explicitly to indirect deception among the *hows* or ways of deception. Let us first remember Grice (1989: 39) on a general basic point: “[...] the truth of a conversational implicatum is not required by the truth of what is said (what is said may be true - what is implicated may be false)”. Implicatures can be true or false, regardless of the truth or falsity of what is said. One can also speak falsely (lie) and yet imply something which is true, or use literal truth and imply a falsehood (see e.g. Vincent & Castelfranchi 1981).

Joking, irony, hyperbole, silence, etc. can also be used deceptively (see e.g. Mizzau 1997), or, in Grice’s terms one can *pretend* to be merely flouting or opting

out, etc., that is, in goals analysis terms, by deceiving on the higher covert (non-communicative super-goal).

Castelfranchi & Vincent (1977/97), Vincent & Castelfranchi (1981), Castelfranchi & Poggi (1994, 1998), Poggi & Boffa (1997) describe many indirect strategies of deception which exploit the hierarchical goal structure of action and interaction and the various 'physiological' characteristics of language described earlier. They illustrate from daily life, but Shakespeare's Iago also conveniently displays most of the range (see Vincent 1982, Vincent Marrelli 2004, and Sullivan 2001: 108-117). Castelfranchi and associates (*passim*) systematically use the distinction between the goals or intentions which are communicative and communicated (or manifest) and those or that (the super-goal) which is concealed (in the case of deception). For example, one can, as part of a strategy, let a hearer understand that one is pretending ('acting' is non-deceptive pretending, it has a communicative communicated goal), but there is another higher level act of pretending which is not communicated, as in pretending to be acting, and pretending to be lying (fake lying). Castelfranchi, Poggi and Vincent also look at presupposition faking (see also, e.g., Weiser 1974 and Fraser 1994 on 'implicit' means), pretending to be intending to deceive, pretending to be pretending to lie, etc. The distinctions depend on the goal levels where the masking or revealing of the pretending is located.

A good illustration of one type of indirect lying, is in the famous 'Jewish' joke, found in many different versions; reported in Barnes (1994: 113) from Sigmund Freud's version, it goes:

"Two Jews met in a railway carriage at a station in Galicia: 'Where are you going? Asked one. 'To Cracow', was the answer. 'What a liar you are!' broke out the other. 'If you say you're going to Cracow, you want me to believe you're going to Lemberg. But I know that in fact you're going to Cracow. So why are you lying to me?!'"

Barnes (1994: 113) also refers us to Augustine's discussion, discussing whether or not **telling the truth deceptively** constitutes lying (see also Siegler 1966; Vincent & Castelfranchi 1981). Castelfranchi & Poggi also discuss this joke in the context of strategies of lying/deceiving which exploit the other's diffidence rather than than his or her trust (1994: 211-212; see also Barton Bowyer 1982: 225 on deceiving deceivers).

We naturally cannot examine this or other types or examples; to describe a strategy or a case is often very space consuming because it entails discussing fine details (not just informational departure from truth, or even goal plans, but these and others too which we have been mentioning at various points) , e.g., those concerning beliefs about one's own beliefs, about those of the other, about ones' intentions goals (ulterior motives), and those of the other, about the degree of concern or importance (relevance) to ego or alter, their degree of strength, the possible consequences to ego and alter of concealing or inventing, other possible hearers, the relationship between the interlocutors, the required degree of truth relevant to the situation, the type of talk, other alternative possible strategies and their social and psychological and moral consequences, the cost and benefit balance, the processing and memory effort, etc.²⁸

A word now about 'half-truth'. The expression also has a vague, unstable denotation. It seems to cover for various possible different strategies for 'editing truth' or for 'selective display', in lay and technical usage. Garfinkel (1977: 138) refers to a definition used in law : "half-truths, which, though literally true, are false, in that they engender false inferences". This is still vague (and difficult to apply in court, as he shows), and can be perpetrated by many different means, as can indeed 'indirect lying', or even 'lying while saying the truth'. Vincent & Castelfranchi (1981: 762) attempt to use the term 'half-truth' more specifically, essentially using something like the Gricean maxim of Quantity (the degree to which you (do not) give the information you have or you know would be a goal of the other if they knew you had it (not 'all of the truth' in other words, that would be *relevant or important* to the addressee).

A false implicature from a literally true statement can also be carried by means such as deliberate equivocation or ambiguity between literal meaning and the wider meaning one knows will generally be taken as understood (or implied). Lawyer A.L. Allen (2002), arguing, incidentally, for allowing lying for (sexual) privacy, discusses the Clinton-Lewinsky case. The President "temporarily sought refuge in technical definitions of sexual conduct [...] [He] denied a 'sexual relationship' with 'that woman' on national television because he could honestly say he never experienced" full sexual intercourse with her. This might be analyzed as exploiting the first Quality sub-maxim (assuming it refers to 'strict, literal truthfulness' as Wilson 1997, Wilson & Sperber 2000 postulate), to deceive through implicature, while 'saying' the truth. It might also be seen as being triggered by

violating Grice's Quantity 1 perhaps, and Manner 2 (ambiguity), Horn's Q-principle, or Levinson's Q- and I- principles.

For further general and detailed discussions of these and other aspects of lying and deception, the reader can further refer to the discussions in the works mentioned at the beginning of this section. But also let us not forget the linguists and pioneering emancipatory pragmaticians Bolinger (1976); R. Lakoff (1981); Weiser (1974); Garfinkel (1977); who looked at various *ways* in which manipulating the full range of 'physiological' language resources, especially ambiguity, indeterminacy, presupposition embedding, non-literality, indirectness, and to some extent, how exploiting the Quantity and Manner maxims, may be put to deceptive uses. For references to earlier works describing ways of lying, see also Feehan's bibliography (1998); Steiner (1976: 221 n.1); Weinrich (1976).

We have inevitably already touched on moral issues several times above; the next section addresses these more explicitly and brings us back to contextual and cross-cultural questions.

8. Moral issues

Deception is found in every culture (only attitudes to it differ).
(Nyberg 1993: 12)

What is truthfulness? It is the speaking of words/Which are entirely
free from harmful effects/ Even falsehood is of the nature of truth/
If it gives good results free from fault. (Saint Tiruvalluvar, *The Holy Kural* 291, 292)

It might be worth remembering first that manipulation, seduction (with *their* pejorative connotations) can be perpetrated also through truth/truthfulness (see Parret 1994). Language is for influencing people, a set of devices adapted to this goal (Castelfranchi & Poggi 1994: 290), and this can be pursued either through telling the truth or through deception, and with benign or exploitative intentions (to use Goffman's terms). Furthermore, truthfulness can also be harmful, invasive, or somehow unwelcome to the hearer as in gratuitous *truth dumping* (Bok 1999), or when the right to speak it is not granted to a particular interlocutor by the addressee.

Taxonomies of types of deception based on ends/motives are typically involved in ethical discussions, in that considering ‘ends’ implies taking interpersonal effects into account. Aquinas (*Summa Th*: II-II, q.110 art. 2) reports the now famous threefold distinction, mentioned earlier, referring to a biblical gloss on Psalm 57 (‘Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie’) between *officious*, *jocose* and *mischievous* lies (i.e. lies made ‘for the wellbeing and convenience of someone’, those ‘told in fun’, and those ‘told out of malice’, respectively; see extract in Bok 1999: 256). They are all ‘sins’ yet not all of equal gravity. On what increases or diminishes their gravity, Aquinas quotes Augustine’s eight types (see *de Mendacio*, 25, Bk:250-251): summarised as “the useful good is better than the pleasurable good and life of the body than money, and virtue than the life of the body” (see also extracts in Bok 1999: 255-257). Goffman’s (1967) distinction between *benign* and *exploitative prefabrication* alluded to above also incorporates a moral stance, as does that between *ego* and *alter protective* strategies (Castelfranchi & Poggi, or that between *prosocial* and *antisocial* (Fu et al. 2001), or the longer list suggested by Seiter et al. (2002) of motives²⁹. These are often seen as clines rather than strict distinctions- see, e.g., Fu et al. (2001); Anolli et al. (2002:); and see Vincent Marrelli 2004: 198-220, for discussion on moral issues in cross-cultural perspective (concerning both deception itself, and the acceptability of ‘violations’ of Gricean maxims), and see note 21).

In the Chisholm & Feehan (1977) typology mentioned earlier (see table 2), a moral cline is also suggested, following, however, the dimension of diminishing ‘personal responsibility’ or ‘communicativeness’ (according to Parret 1980 and to Chisholm & Feehan themselves). The idea is that there might be a universal intrinsic disvalue as one moves from (a) to (d), (e) to (h). Moreover, (a) is worse than (e), (b) worse than (f). Whether all the *commission* types are worse than any of the *omission* ones, is not easy to decide as Parret says (1980: 7). And we might add, that this would need to be investigated cross-culturally before one could make universal statements.

Lying, (a), positive deception *simpliciter* by commission, is at once the simplest and most discussed case or type (among philosophers at least), and that involved in the ‘quandary discussions’ (where there are conflicting moral issues). Kant (1797, see Bok 1999: 268-269), for whom truthfulness is a ‘categorical imperative’, notoriously ruled out the possibility of direct lying even to a would-be murderer, as also the ‘virtuous’ Protestant pastor discussed in Nyberg (1993: 57-8) felt

he must, even to the Nazis (and even at personal risk to his own life and to that of his young son). However, even Kant and the pastor would see (d), and the other types, (e.g. through faking, by silence, pretending, etc.), as permissible in similar situations or even in less dramatic ones: “Truthfulness in statements which cannot be avoided” is “an unconditional duty which holds in all circumstances” (271) [emphasis added], for letting in “even the least exception” would undermine the “ground of all duties based on contract” (Kant 1797, Bok 1999: 269). Adler (1996) questions this moral worseness of straight direct lying, however. For him, indirect ‘deception’ is arguably worse, *because* it avoids responsibility or commitment.

It is, indeed, the general moral injunction against *direct lying* which generates the profusion of indirect lying strategies: the multitude of ways we have “evolved of avoiding both truth telling and lying” (Nyberg 1993: 53). Note that these discussions are typically versed as timeless and assuming universal validity. Although the injunction is strongest in ‘Western’ or at least in the Utilitarian ethos (see Scollon & Scollon 1995), it does seem perhaps that indirect will be preferred to direct lying or deception (assuming indirect deception is universally classifiable as real deception, in the first place- see note 21 and below). Some cultures do not see indirectness itself as necessarily devious or deceptive, but often as *more polite ways of expressing the truth (not as indirect ways of lying)*. Lapinski & Levine, among the communications studies scholars engaged in experimental investigations of different cultures’ judgements of deceptiveness (using the *IMT* apparatus – based, as mentioned earlier on a very simplified version of the Gricean maxims and their violation), explicitly question the generalizability of deception studies conducted solely in the United States and without examining the role of culture. Their own and others’ studies (such as that by Yeung et al. 1999, mentioned earlier) using *IMT* cross-culturally, find that subjects from *interdependent* self-construal culture members do not judge violations of Manner, Quantity and Relevance (called by *IMT* ‘equivocation’, ‘omission’) ‘evasion’, respectively), as essentially deceptive or less honest than the ‘baseline’ direct truth (and often as more acceptable), in contrast to independent self-construal culture members (see, e.g., also in Vincent Marrelli 2004: 335-336; 343-351 for more discussion).

Furthermore, and interestingly for us in pragmatics, much discussion on lying and deception by non-linguists (philosophers, e.g. Nyberg, Bok, and Solomon), sociologists (e.g. Barnes), cognitive and social psychologists (Castelfranchi & Poggi 1994: 97-8), and, notably, by some of those working in ‘communication

studies', not all within the *IMT* paradigm, however, (e.g. Yeung et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2001; to some degree, Anolli et al. (2002), and especially Seiter et al. 2002), does focus on (what we would call, and would do well to remember) the context of talk, variously, who, to whom (interlocuors' relationship) about what, in which context, with which goals, who stands to benefit, what genre of talk.

Solomon's (1993: 36-41) identification of 'three theories of lying' can be useful to put some of this into focus. He sees three major groups of theorists, most of whom agree that lying is wrong but who disagree on *why* it is wrong: (a) that focusing on the '*abstract nature of the lie*' (as in Kant, for example, who sees it as a 'perfect duty' a 'categorical imperative', and Aquinas (see *Summa Th. II,II,q.110. art.2*) who says that the *nature* of the lie is the 'proper and essential division' (feature/category) of lying, because 'truth is a kind of equality' between sign and signified (op. cit: q.109, art.2); (b) the 'Utilitarian' viewpoint, looking as it does at consequences, focuses more on the receiver/addressee, the *victim/dupe* and, mainly on the harmful consequences for the victim. According to Solomon (1993: 37) Bok is an example of a utilitarian who ends up rejecting 'the ends justify the means' arguments, and "upholds a virtually blanket condemnation of lying that is in practice as strict as Kant's deontologically 'perfect duty' to tell the truth"; (c) a 'virtue' or character ethical approach (coming from Aristotle and notably revived by MacIntyre today) which focuses on the *liar's character* (the virtuous character is just naturally 'unable' to tell a lie - typically the direct lie).⁷ Solomon then implies a fourth type of focus of attention, when he entertains the question of self-deception (which is inextricably 'tangled' with deception), that which considers the *liar's motives* and need for (and implicitly right to) self-preservation, where important attenuating circumstances, if viewed from the liar's point of view, can be seen (and we are all liars at one time or another).

Solomon (1993) and Nyberg (1993), indeed, both strongly posit the ethical importance of focusing on the circumstances of the lying, foregrounding relationships between people, attending to individual or particular situations rather than to lying in the abstract (a declared bottom-up methodology). Nyberg lists four aspects of the event which must be taken into account when evaluating it: the *actors*, the *purpose*, the *manner*, the *consequences*, and he lists seven beliefs that limit the obligation to tell the truth, briefly: concerning rights to some but not all information; not all share equal rights (they can forfeit them); the in/voluntariness of the

situation; avoiding doing harm to others; helping others when possible; put people before things when possible; there are natural survival priorities (1993: 76-78)³⁰.

On specific discussions involving rights and obligations or responsibilities see also Grotius (1625); Sidgwick (1910); Korsgaard (1986); Bok (1999). Kant in his famous essay (1797) was arguing against his contemporary the French Utilitarian Benjamin Constant on this issue. For Kant, truth-telling was a 'categorical imperative' one that allowed no exceptions under any circumstances.

On the right to not tell just anyone one's secrets, on the right to privacy, indeed, see Allen (1999), Castelfranchi & Poggi (1998: 71-81) and Bok's specific monograph (1983) dedicated to discussing moral aspects of secrecy. Steiner (1976: 226) approvingly quotes Nietzsche (*Will to Power*) "the demand that one should denude oneself with every word one says is a piece of naiveté".

Ethnographers remind us that many societies do not expect truthfulness (literal or higher-order) of others (even in their communities or in-groups) in many circumstances, anyway, but respect their right to silence or even deception if necessary to conceal or keep truth to which the other has no right, or has not earned (see e.g. Ochs 1976 as mentioned earlier), or, indeed, "because it offers a chance to escape confrontations without having to fight" (Nyberg 1993: 12).

Steiner takes it further, stressing the defensive 'survival' functions of deception, reminding us of the defensive functions against potentially hostile out-group members, and that universal brother-/sister-hood is not the only realistic view. Deception can be seen as defensive, not just aggressive, and as such would be morally justifiable, and 'biologically' adaptive, because it has allowed us to 'survive', both in the struggle 'at the water-hole' (Steiner 1976: 223-226), and as a guarantee of privacy, of secrecy (and therefore survival) of a threatened community or in-group by an 'enemy' group: "in the beginning the word was largely a pass-word" (1976: 231). The enemy is also 'reality' (p. 226): we need lies to create 'alternity', to generate 'counter-worlds' (p. 218), "to vanquish this [cruel...] reality, this 'truth', we need lies in order to live" (p. 227, quoting Nietzsche in *Will to Power*).

Furthermore, in circumstances like 'diplomacy', military tactics and war (see e.g. Mattox 2000; Sullivan 2001: 229-292; Sun Tzu 512 BC; Machiavelli 1515), deception is seen as protective and necessary to prevent worse things (such as defeat and the unnecessary death of one's men!), and also because the enemy have no right to your sincerity or truth, nor do they expect it (Sullivan 2001; but see

Bok 1999: 134-145). Even here, there is, nonetheless, a code of honour. The 'perfidious Albion' tactics (a phrase dating from the Anglo-French Hundred-Years War), still rankle, the objection to them and the stereotype still strong on 'the continent' concerning British 'hypocrisy' and 'perfidy'. That the 'continentals' (such as the French and Italians) should object, indicates their underlying preference for 'honest deception', following the expected rules of the game; it is perfidy to break the 'rules of the game.' (see Vincent Marrelli 2004, and works cited there on perhaps different rules of what is what is 'fair in love and war').

Another angle, which further articulates the question, is *who* has the right/power/authority *to tell* or *define* the truth (it could be scientists, the African 'man-of-words' or chief, or a philosopher, a TV comedian, or 'joker' advising a ruler). On this see Fernandez-Armesto (chapter II especially), Lindstrom (1992), Foucault (1984), specifically for the history of *parrhesia* (*frankness*), where truth-telling can be viewed, among other things, on the parameter of 'dangerousness' to the speaker, insofar as it is hurtful to the *hearer* (who is more powerful), and thus, for other reasons too, it is only *tolerated*, forgiven, outside these exalted ranks, of children or the insane, etc. Grotius, incidentally, also says that children are not owed the truth.

At the same time, we might note again the implicit theory of language and linguistic ethics that disdains 'double'-talk (viz 'duplicity'), indirectness, preferring simple or 'single' talk (straightforwardness), also perceptible in Adler's (1997) argument that straight lying is less odious than 'devious' 'deception' or double-talk. Whitsitt (1991) provides an insightful (and highly entertaining) characterization of the WASP 'tight-fit' language-meaning plain talk ethos. Saarni & Lewis (1993: 13) report the strong American (USA) concern with lying and how calling someone a liar is 'a very significant insult'. Scollon & Scollon (1995: ch.6) and Hofstede (1994: ch.7 on 'virtue vs. truth') compare different discourse and value systems (see, e.g., their discussions of the Chinese or Confucian discourse system and ethos, or face system, in comparison to the CBS or Utilitarian discourse world). Forster in his cross-culturally sensitive literary work tells us: "Truth is not truth in that exacting land [India], unless there go with it kindness and more kindness and kindness again, unless the Word that was with God also is God" (Forster 1982: 245).

On the cultural variation of attitudes to deception and lying and truth-telling, there seem to be so far few systematic general or wide-ranging comparative overviews (Duranti 1993 and Rosaldo 1982 are exceptions to some degree), but Barnes

(1994: 65-78) (who also discusses social class differences), and Saarni & Lewis (1993) dedicate a specific (short) chapter and section, respectively to cultural diversity. The ethnographic descriptions of individual societies (Duranti 1988; Rosaldo 1982; Ochs 1976; Lindstrom 1992; Harris 1996), mentioned earlier, and others referred to in Barnes (1994), or the more or less systematic contrastive pragmatics studies of two or more cultures on some practices or lexical sets (Wierzbicka 1991;⁸ George 1990; Vincent Marrelli 1989, 1994, 1997; etc.), are however beginning to make inroads into the previously prevailing anecdotal, and inevitably usually 'politically incorrect' (not to say 'racist'), comments of sojourners or travellers (as reported in Said 1995: 38, for example, or in Barnes 1994:65). We can, however, as said earlier, expect useful data from the new work being carried out by communication studies and deception studies researchers such as Yeung et al. (1999); Fu et al. (2001), Seiter et al. (2002).

Throughout the ages, in religious and philosophical systems, there have been different attitudes explicitly expressed and promulgated. All religious systems have an explicit disvalue of lying, but most, except, significantly, for some Protestant views, which follow the 'letter' of the Bible (and it may not have been a coincidence that Kant had a strict Pietist upbringing), allow for attenuating circumstances, to do, essentially, with not harming others, and may define lying accordingly so as to not include some type of non-truthfulness as 'bad'. For the views found in different moral philosophical traditions, see e.g. Solomon's three theories mentioned above (Solomon 1993) and Barnes (1994: 136 ff.), Bok (1999: 48 ff.), who also overview the attitudes to lying in different religious systems. e.g. Sullivan (2001: 2-28) is a lively discussion on the differences between Old and New Testament views on deception, and lies found in the Bible.

Laity, everywhere, has always probably simply operated with the principle that peoples' feelings, or ego- or alter 'face', are more important than facts or beliefs (as even the findings by Coleman & Kay 1981 in a WASP society suggest). However, different individuals in different cultures may also well have different types of unease, guilt, attached to this. Seeing deception in a pro-social light as 'tact' makes it more palatable: "in any culture being tactful is an important means of maintaining the sense of cooperation and supportiveness necessary for successful interaction" (Janney & Arndt 1992: 21); see on the solidary function of 'politeness' (though unspecified, in 'Western' societies'), e.g. Green (1990); Gumperz (1990); Lakoff (1973); Leech (1984); Vincent Marrelli (1989); and naturally Goffman 'on

face-work' in general (1967: 5-45). Goffman's (1975) distinction between *benign* and *exploitative* fabrication also seems often to have been forgotten. Studies on deception or non-truthfulness have overwhelmingly focussed on the second, and have thus had to struggle to incorporate the first (morally to excuse it or not, as the case may be). Anolli et al. (2002) stress that it is a cline rather than a strict distinction (and Augustine's 5th c. distinctions mentioned earlier may be taken this way too, perhaps).

In the end, the moral (and methodological) *Zeitgeist* today seems to be that it is Trust rather than Truthfulness which must be at issue. Nyberg (1994: 80) says "To live decently with one another we do not need moral purity, we need discretion-which means tact in regard to truth; an 'ethic of caring' rather than of truthfulness; truth is 'morally over-rated' (Nyberg 1993:210 ff.); people and relationships are more important than facts. As Nietzsche had said (perhaps relevantly to this point) : "not that you lied to me but that I no longer believe you - that is what has distressed me" (Nietzsche 1990: 107, Maxim 183).

With this focus on the relationship between speaker and hearer, the nature of the implicit *contract* between them is put in relief, in particular whether there is already an underlying Trust between them, rather than one of conflict, competition or even a non-committal one. If you get into an involuntary situation with someone, you have to choose whether truth-telling is 'reasonable' (Nyberg 1993: 78). A contract is also susceptible of re-negotiation as the relationship or interaction unfolds dynamically (from diffidence to trust, or viceversa). If one remembers, furthermore, that there is also an underlying linguistic contract, concerning the default mode of interpretation, one of literal vs. indirect use of language, one of default precision vs default vagueness, one may reach a more 'satisfying' if not less tangled view of the web.

Cross-cultural and people-related viewpoints, finally, point to non-truthfulness and even lying and deception as not necessarily the ultimate source of evil. There are, after all, bad and good bacteria, as Nyberg (1993: 2) inspiringly suggests (those that cause disease, those that give us cheese and wine). Bacon (1625/1999: 262) had made an equally inspired analogy though with opposite intent: "mixture of falsehood is like allay in coin of gold and silver; which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth". What seems to be emerging, however, as the currently favoured candidate for a universal moral principle (whether or not it is as yet universally explicitly accepted), is that what is wrong is to break a contract of Trust, or maybe just the contract, whatever it stipulates. If it is one

of conflict, many people (in many cultures) will expect, accept, and even respect, deception and lying, and if it is one of trust and consensus on solidarity, they will accept supportive lying too.

9. Issues and areas not covered here

There are many more issues (and writers/thinkers) which could have been discussed. I have notably only mentioned in passing, or not at all, issues interfacing with truth-conditional semantics issues,⁸ and issues of truth/truthfulness/deception, in, for instance:

- art, play, fiction (see Steiner 1976; Gadamer 1989; Wilde 1889; Huizinga 1949; Barton Bowyer 1982: 155f);
- ‘self-deception’ (Solomon 1993; Nyberg 1993: V; Ford 1996: 38 ff.; Steiner 1976: 229; Alton (2005) for an extensive bibliography);
- forgetting or selective memory (Gadamer 1989: 15-16; Eco 1987; Martone 1997; Steiner 1976: 226);
- pathologies of deceit (see e.g. Ford 1999; Healy & Healy 2004);
- deception detection (see, e.g. Ekman 1985; Ekman et al. 1997; Vrij 2001, Granhag & Strömwall 2004);
- neurological correlates of lying (see e.g. for a review of research Hughes et al. 2005).
- ontogenetic and/or phylogenetic perspectives on strategic, ‘social’ or ‘Machiavellian’ Intelligence (see Byrne & Whiten 1988, 1997; Origgi & Sperber 2000); and/or issues relating to High Mach, Machiavellian personalities and skills in deception (see e.g. in Anolli et al. (2002: 92).
- gender and age differences (DePaulo et al. 1993; DePaulo & Jordan 1982; Robinson et al. (1998)
- the tractists and socially concerned and/or cynical satirists of the Italian Renaissance (Battista, Machiavelli, see also the provocatively entitled collection by Nigro 1991) and Spanish siglo de oro (Gracián, Quevedo);
- the French essayists and aphoristes such as Montaigne, Talleyrand; in British literature, Swift/Gulliver and his Houyhnhnms and Yahoos, and, for example, the more recent Morrow (1990) and his ‘City of Truth’ (*Veritas*, the *vera-city*) and its mirror image *Satirev*;

- the prankster and trickster motifs throughout the literatures and mythologies around the world (see Sullivan 2001: 29-51).
- truthfulness/deception and sophistry in academic research (see Bok 1999),
- the speech of lawyers (see Sullivan 2001:73 ff.);
- deception and cheating in diplomacy (see hints in Green 1990: 424-5; Barnes 1994:23;
- strategic studies (military ‘intelligence’, see, e.g., Barton Bowyer 1982; Mattox 2000; Sullivan 2001: 230-254; Godson & Wirtz, (eds.) (2002);
- truth, deception, protection, manipulation in the digital information age, and in the digital media (e.g. Fides 1995);
- the vast literatures in law studies (but see some issues , e.g. Brewer 2005, and in Vrij 2001, and in Granhag & Strömwall 2004),
- the even vaster religious studies literature on different doctrinal attitudes towards lying and deception.

For a rich online bibliography reaching back through history on many aspects of deception relevant to philosophy, politics and religious studies see, however, Cavaillé (2005).

10. Valediction

There has inevitably been a selective display here, with no (conscious) intent to deceive, but there can be no guarantee of accuracy of representation. “Perhaps no-one has ever been sufficiently truthful about what ‘truthfulness’ is” (Nietzsche maxim n.177, 1990: 106). Comfort comes from Kant, however, on the impossibility of total error, from Aquinas *‘falsum fundatur in aliquo vero’* , but mainly from Mark Twain: “Truth is the most valuable thing we have. Let us economise it”.

Notes

1. ‘Truthfulness’ shares the field, and overlaps (in English, at least) with the following terms and expressions, to name only a few: *truth*, *truth-telling*, *accuracy*, *sincerity*, *honesty*, *candour*; *authenticity*, *veracity*, *verediction*; *plain talk*, *straight talk*; *strictly speaking*, *literally speaking*; *saying what you mean*, *meaning what you say*, *saying*

what's on your mind. See also the important treatises (not-to-be-missed) on the development in the West of some of these notions by Williams (2002), most especially on 'accuracy' and 'sincerity' which he terms "the two virtues" of truthfulness, and by Trilling (1971), on 'sincerity' and 'authenticity'.

2. As they say "Most current theories share Grice's view that inferential comprehension is governed by expectations about the behaviour of speakers, but differ as to what these expectations are". Among the Neo-Griceans, apart from Horn and Levinson mentioned here in the text, and who they say "stay relatively close to Grice's maxims" they also mention Atlas and Gazdar.

3. On the cultural aspect, see also Wierzbicka (1991: 102) on different cultural scripts involving expectations of non-/truthfulness, and see also Van Dijk (2005b). In the latter's proposed development of a "pragmatic account of lying" to be based on a new "multidisciplinary theory of context", a "subjective" model (a mental model) of (relevant) context with "the relevant aspects of the communicative situation [seen as defined] by the participants themselves" (mutual knowledge about each others' knowledge being the crucial element which he sees as missing in previous treatments of context -and of lying, he seems to imply). Van Dijk postulates "micro" and "macro" contexts, where "macro contexts" would include cultural categories and presupposed cultural knowledge, and envisages different epistemic communities across cultures. Van Dijk 2005 b) does not engage however with previous models of lying and deception (the Castelfranchi et al. goals analysis model, for example) which do explicitly and necessarily take interactants' mutual presumptions of mutual knowledge and relevance-to-participants into account, or, indeed, for example, of Sperber (2000, 2001) on mind-modelling and meta-representation, in, among other things, on line deception strategies and avoidance, nor with the developed tradition of social (and indeed cognitive) simulation in AI (see e.g. that of Miceli & Castelfranchi, Conte and Castelfranchi, and their colleagues in autonomous agent and multi agent systems in AI which are both cognitive and sociological...(Castelfranchi 2001). and cognitive and interaction modelling on social simulation incorporating also attention to social norms and independent decisions to conform- see e.g. Castelfranchi 2001). Despite his apparent non-engagement with these traditions, Van Dijk's (e.g. 2005b) call for a systematic, unified, *multidisciplinary* model of mental models (including subjective representations of relevant social and cultural aspects of context) is timely for the study of deception. Further on, we shall be mentioning how subjective (culturally variable) aspects of context, are beginning to be addressed by scholars in the field of deception studies (see e.g. in Seiter et al. 2002;) and that these studies still apparently have to be known to, let alone incorporated into, that of pragmatics.

4. See also Allen's (2003) very useful review of Williams for some perspective on theoretical and ethical issues raised by Williams on truth and truthfulness, who (to oversimplify) addresses and seeks to reconcile the paradoxical desire and obsession our (post-modern) times have for truthfulness while entertaining doubts about the existence (or non-relativity) of Truth itself. See also Frankfurt (2005) for related issues when, in his bestselling essay on 'bullshit', while looking for possible explanations for its apparent ubiquity today, points to the increasing need in contemporary society to be able and have to talk about things one knows next to nothing about, and who also points to postmodern skepticism of objective truth, but says rather that we have abandoned truthfulness and especially accuracy in favor of sincerity, or as he defines it, staying true to to oneself rather than to facts (which it is assumed cannot be known). For the distinction between accuracy and sincerity, see also Trilling (1971) again. However, Frankfurt also suggests that 'sincerity is bullshit' in that it purports to hold the extraordinary assumption that knowing the truth about oneself (our natures being so elusive) is easier than knowing the truth about things.

Williams (2002), moreover, is also more than worth reading for his take on Nietzsche's profound sincerity and truthfulness.

5. Horn (and Levinson), as we shall see briefly in the next section, develop precisely this rational basis further (in accord with Smith, who disagrees with Lewis (1969) that the CP need be an arbitrary convention). Horn sees it as simply a "a deduction from the general principle that we expect others to behave as best suits their goals" (see Horn 2004: 24, quoting Smith).

6. As 'worked out' in Vincent Marrelli 2004: 50. It must also be mentioned here that this (Autonomy) is not the only (or necessarily universally valid) type of 'rhetoric of morality' to be found among cultures. See Shweder (1991, 1997, 2003) on those of Justice-Autonomy, Community Interdependence, Purity-Divinity. (For a brief discussion on the implications for attitudes to lying/deception, see also in Vincent Marrelli 2004: 363-365).

7. See also Williams' (2002:41-62) relevant 'story' in his chapter on 'the state of nature'.

8. Ramberg & Gjesdal provide a (welcome) and fairly simple historical overview and critical comparison of the different philosophers associated with, and of the trends within, this long – complex and varied – philosophical tradition, which manages to have both ancient beginnings and post-modern branches and relevance. For an idea, scholars/philosophers range, to list only some of those mentioned by Ramberg & Gjesdal, from Chladenius, Meier, Vico, Spinoza, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger to, Gadamer, Betti, Hirsch, Habermas, Apel, Derrida, Ricoeur, Davidson, Rorty.

9. As the new (2005) interdisciplinary *Journal of Politeness Research*, De Gruyter, also seems to indicate- see also the founding group's web-site: <http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/ea/politeness/>, where the interest is currently mostly on the definition of context, as well as on inter- or cross-cultural aspects. For a metatheoretical take on politeness, see also Eelen (2001) issuing from the IprA research centre. In their 2005 note 'Reply to Rajagopalan' Wilson & Sperber reiterate the abiding and programmatic interest in social issues (including politeness theory) to pragmatics and within their Relevance Theory community, referring among other RT studies on aspects of politeness, to Watts 1989, Jary 1998, Zegarac & Clark 1999, Ran 2002, Padilla Cruz 2004.)

10. Kirkham (1995) makes a distinction between *substantive* theories (ranging from *correspondence*, *coherence*, *pragmatic*, *consensus* theories- which attempt to define the 'essence' of truth) and, the *non-substantive* ones (deflationist, etc.) connected to the concerns of truth-conditional semantics, that of the role of truth in anchoring referential meaning. The first type is of no concern to us here (but see some sources mentioned in the text here), and neither of them could be adequately dealt with in a few words. The reader can refer, for the second type, again to Kirkham 1995, and the other sources mentioned discussing truth theories, and also more specifically, to Taylor (1998), Turner (1997, 1998, 1999), Blackburn (1996), Tennant (1997).

11. "[...] the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false; wherefore also the word 'mendacium' is derived from its being in opposition to the 'mind'. Consequently if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker [...] what is beside the speaker's intention is accidental [...] If on the other hand, one utters falsehood formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of the lie" (Aquinas *ST* II,II, q.110, art.1).

12. Anolli 2002, in particular, argues for and outlines a unitary theory of communication and miscommunication, his *MaCHT*- Miscommunication as CHance Theory (where 'chance' seems to be intended to cover both 'luck' and 'freedom'). Miscommunication not only includes its standard meaning such as lacking, defect and violation of communicative rules, and the 'dark side of interpersonal communication' (Parret 1997), but also mismatching interpretation, as well as misrepresentation of information. Miscommunication also covers misunderstanding between speaker and hearer when they do not share the same culture and have different interpretative patterns.

13. At any rate, as Horn (2004: 8) reminds us, "exploiting" is the key/ notion term.

14. Epistemic modality markers such as hedges are interesting in this connection. If in English ‘inner circle’, native-speaking cultures we omit hedges, we imply the full-strength of belief (as neatly shown in Grundy 2000). In order to express less than full strength one would have to mark this explicitly by using a hedge. However, while some cultures might have full strength by default, others, also by default, may have weak strength, where the hedging is implicit; in order to express full-strength one would have to use an explicit marker (as in Neapolitan, for example).

15. Phenomena or practices, such ‘bullshit’ (*bs*) (as analyzed by Frankfurt 2005) might seem to present some problems of categorization, for example, in such a schema. However, despite the apparent similarity of not caring for the precise representation of facts or beliefs, ‘Light talk’, for example, is not to be confused, I think, with Frankfurt’s *bs* (as ‘hot air’). It can be distinguished, perhaps, from it by not being meant by the speaker to be taken by the hearer as such. Furthermore, if we take Frankfurt’s take on it, *bs* is even more subversive than lying, since it shows no regard for, or caring about, truthfulness, at all (unlike the truth-teller or, indeed, the liar). It does, however, according to Frankfurt, carry less moral opprobrium than lying for hearers.

Although the *bs*-er, for Frankfurt, is faking rather than lying, or simply speaking lightly (with his/her ‘hot air’ s/he is engaged in a pretence, a bluff, counterfeit, an invention, a creative act (viz: the bullshit artist), unlike the truth-teller or the liar, the *bs*-er, as said, is not guided by any regard for facts, for the truth of the matter- or his/her beliefs, or about being truthful. The *bs*-er’s disregard for facts is a greater danger to truth than the liar’s (occasional) opposition to it.

However, *bs*-ing can still be said, I believe, to be deceptive (notwithstanding the point that it is directed not towards misrepresentation of the facts known to the speaker or his/her propositional attitudes/beliefs) since it can (and presumably does consciously) have a strategic goal of creating a representation of him/herself, (as Frankfurt says, along with Mack 1985 on ‘humbug’), (though these may be true or false), since it has presumably other manipulatory (and deceptive) further goals. Moreover, pretence itself, according to Castelfranchi & Vincent, & Poggi, at least, is as much an intentional and deceptive act as lying (and, Frankfurt’s *bs* might also be seen to be misrepresenting beliefs (by acting as if there were beliefs, or creating facts when there are none, one is creating/adding a belief a fact). Frankfurt may only be intent on distinguishing it from lying, but not from deception in general. On the other hand, he may be operating with a narrow sense of deception, related only to intentionality of first-order misrepresentation of beliefs and facts, rather than seeing it in a wider intentional plan or hierarchy of goals. *Bs*-ing could even be seen (sometimes) as ‘wishful thinking’? as (perhaps) in the US government’s statements that ‘There is no civil war in Iraq’, and thus partake

of 'self-deception', which complicates the categorization even further. Be that as it may, defining the status, or just pinning down the defining characteristics, of this folk-category (of English, but there are similar categories in other languages/cultures) is not at all simple, as Frankfurt (2005) indeed demonstrates.

16. For *DeMiT* also, deceptive miscommunication has different *layers of intention* (reminiscent of Castelfranchi and associates' intentional plans or goals analysis model of deception- at least on *DeMiT*'s second intentional layer): "a) *covert* ... (the speaker intends to deceive the addressee by manipulating the information, but this intention must not be revealed); b) *overt*... (the speaker intends to convey the manipulation of information to the addressee). This second intentional layer is, in its turn, twofold: b1) *informative*... (the speaker wants to give the addressee the manipulated information as if it were true); b2) '*sincerity*' 'I want you to believe that I believe what I am saying'. etc. (Anolli et al. 2002:77).

17. Van der Henst et al.'s (2002) article discusses the issue of rounding from within Relevance Theory. They do not discuss cultural differences (incidentally, they base their remarks on data collected with French speakers in Paris asked for the time on the street), but their general theory which appeals to relevance in context for participants can be seen to naturally accomodate cultural differences in contextual expectations.

18. On recent discussions of *irony* (from which earlier important works can be located), see for, e.g., Giora 2001 and, generally, Anolli et al. (eds.) (2002); the contributions in *Journal of Pragmatics* 32, (2000); Colston & Katz (eds.). (2004); Gibbs & Colston (eds.). (in press); for work on *humour*, see contributions in *Journal of Pragmatics*, Vol 35 No 9 (2003); generally in *Humor: International Journal of Humor Research* (an extensive bibliography on humour research can also be found on the homepage of the *The International Society for Humor Studies*: <http://www.hnu.edu/ishs/>).

19. It is usually taken in the literature that it is the more direct speakers who accuse indirect speakers of hypocrisy. The fact that it can be reversed shows that imputed hypocrisy can perhaps simply be a consequence of a clash between discourse worlds or rhetorics (see also Vincent Marrelli 1997; and Zaharna 1995 on 'rhetorical ethnocentrism').

20. by British and Northern Italian and Neapolitan social actors (seeing at least two kinds of Neapolitans: the 'polite' and the 'impolite').

21. Communication scholars Anolli et al. 2002, at least do not seem to have forgotten this altogether; see their schema when developing their *DeMiT*, since they refer to different kinds of intention (referential, informative, communicative- *op. cit.* 2002: 77).

22. See <http://geert-hofstede.international-business-center.com/index.shtml>, for updates and criticism of the Hofstede reserach paradigm.

23. It is worth mentioning that intercultural educators take much of this for granted: see e.g. Daradirek Ekachai's course notes on cultural attitudes toward verbal messages at <http://www.siu.edu/~ekachai/301.html> (online in 2001).
24. The term 'deception', incidentally, is also unstable in reference throughout the literature/s. Some authors use it as a cover-term for all intentionally misleading non-truthfulness (as Chisholm & Feehan 1977, and as adopted here throughout), while others like Adler (1997) and occasionally Nyberg (1993), to refer only to indirect lying/deception, all that is not direct straight lying or 'positive deception simpliciter by commission' (see Table 2.1).
25. Anolli et al. 2002, in their general *MaCHT* (Miscommunication as CHance theory) Theory, (for whom "miscommunication is neither a collection of abnormal communicative phenomena nor does it depend on the violation of an ideal model or of a standard system of communication": 20), also consider all semiotic modes or the plurality of signalling systems.
26. For this last element, not always stressed in discussions, see also Grotius (1625) and Grandy (1973: 407): "not any old truth, or any undifferentiated truth, is adequate".
27. *IMT* researchers, most interestingly have begun to start using their protocol experimentally with subjects not only from the USA, but also in comparative studies with other cultures to capture judgements of deceptiveness of the violations of the different 'maxims' (i.e., general Gricean categories), (notably the Chinese; see e.g. Yeung et al. 1999, Lapinsky & Levine (2000), who also relate results to dimensions isolated by cross-cultural psychology (self construal as independent or interdependent – see in Yeung et al. (1999) . Although theirs is a simple model, it is nonetheless worthy of attention, since it is apparently the first attempt to systematically investigate deception cross-culturally. Notwithstanding the possible *IMT* assumption (mistaken) that deviating from directness in message design is all that is needed to identify deception (see also Anolli & Ciceri 2002: 75), and universally, when it is used to investigate perceptions/definitions of deceptiveness cross-culturally, it is no longer culture bound, and can be seen to be at the service of seeing just how far definitions might vary, and thus would seem to belie (or contradict) any assumption that message design is sufficient without bringing in other contextual factors.
28. (see also Anolli et al.'s (2002: 75) comments, when they argue also for a unitary theory of communication including both deceptive and 'default' communication, since, they both involve metarepresentation and contextually sensitive local management of strategies). They also criticise the 'violation' model of deception, unlike the *IMT* whom they also refer to.

29. Seiter et al. (2002) who investigated, experimentally by structured questionnaires, the acceptability of lying and/or deception as a function of perceiver's culture, deceiver's intention and the relationship between the deceiver and the deceived, list and investigate cases of deception in the motivational categories of: affiliation, benefit to other, privacy, avoidance of conflict, protection of self, impression management, benefit self/no harm other, benefit self/harm other, and malice, and they found that "the factor which most determines the acceptability of deception is 'motive' ", and that "different motives are more or less acceptable across different relationships" (op. cit.: 167). They found differences between Chinese and US subjects (linked to their respective *interdependent/independent* self-construal, or 'collectivistic/individualistic' types of culture) in which motives made some lies more acceptable than others, generally found deception to be (slightly) more acceptable across the board to the Chinese subjects, and speculated that "ethical judgements tend to be more absolute in individualistic cultures and thus motives for lying were regarded unimportant to our US sample." (op. cit.: 173). They also did not fail to mention that *IMT* investigation findings (e.g., by Yeung et al. 1999) suggest that the Chinese may have a narrower view of what constitutes deception in the first place, since they have a higher tolerance for violations of the conversational maxims than people from the US. So, indeed, the scenarios being proposed to the two sets of subjects, classed a priori as cases of deception and being offered for judgements of their acceptability, may not have all been universally classifiable as deception, in the first place.

30. This, we might note, comes from an American moral philosopher speculating in the abstract; but, it both finds corroboration, and gives moral justification to, the practices, as we have seen, revealed by experimental studies carried out in the US (to some degree) on subjects' judgments (by – anthropological?– linguists or semanticists investigating prototypical aspects of lying (Coleman & Kay and Sweetser 1987) but mostly from communication studies scholars investigating practices and definitions intra- and cross-culturally).

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